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1339 
CONTESTING POLICE CREDIBILITY 
Rachel Moran* 
Abstract: Criminal cases often amount to credibility contests between two actors: the 
complainant, testifying for the government, and the defendant. In theory, the defendant’s 
opportunity to attack the credibility of government witnesses should be equal to or greater than 
the government’s opportunity to attack the credibility of the defendant, given that the defendant 
has a constitutional right to a fair trial. But when the government’s witnesses are police 
officers, the converse occurs. Although the phenomenon of police officers lying at trial is so 
well documented that it has its own euphemism, “testilying,” the law imposes tremendous 
obstacles to defense counsel obtaining and utilizing evidence about officers that would call 
into question their credibility as witnesses. 
The thesis of this Article is that, when it comes to helping a jury assess the credibility of 
defendants and police officer witnesses, the law gets it backward. On the one hand, our data 
collection systems and evidentiary doctrines allow the government nearly instant access to a 
defendant’s entire history of encounters with the law, disincentivize defendants from testifying 
at their own trials, and give prosecutors myriad means to introduce evidence suggesting that 
the defendant is, based on prior misdeeds, likely to be guilty of the charged crime. On the other 
hand, the law perversely prevents defendants from casting doubt on the credibility of police 
officers, by making police misconduct records confidential and, in many cases, inaccessible to 
defendants. This unequal distribution of access and ability to utilize information creates trials 
where the jury is exposed to extensive evidence suggesting the accused is an incredible, and 
likely guilty party, but remains naïve to the many reasons to question the credibility of the 
police officer. 
This Article, while grounded in a rich tradition of scholarly literature critiquing the many 
ways the American criminal system venerates law enforcement and represses people of color, 
provides a novel contribution to that literature by exposing the particularly problematic 
imbalances that result when the government is not only prosecuting a defendant, but also acting 
as his primary accuser. After thoroughly analyzing the doctrines that enable these inequities, 
this Article provides recommendations for reform in three areas: (1) the lack of thorough 
recordkeeping and accurate data pertaining to police misconduct; (2) the laws that prevent 
defense counsel from accessing and utilizing police misconduct records that do exist; and 
(3) the evidentiary rules that permit governments to access and utilize bad acts and character 
evidence against defendants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Criminal trials often amount to credibility contests between two 
primary actors: the complainant or accuser, testifying for the government, 
and the defendant. If a defendant invokes a right not to testify,1 the verdict 
                                                     
1. Although statistics regarding the percentage of defendants who testify at their own trial are not 
available at a national level, some scholars put the number at approximately 50%. See Theodore 
Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal 
Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1356–57 (2009) 
(studying data from more than 300 criminal trials to conclude that 60% of defendants without criminal 
records, and 45% of defendants with criminal records, testified in those cases); Gregory M. Gilchrist, 
Trial Bargaining, 101 IOWA L. REV. 609, 642 (2016) (citing Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The 
Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1450 (2005)); Alexandra Natapoff, supra, 
at 1450 (2005) (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-
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may depend entirely on the credibility of the government’s witness. Given 
that the defendant is presumed innocent, one might expect that a 
defendant’s opportunity to attack the credibility of government witnesses 
would be equal to or greater than the government’s opportunity to attack 
the credibility of the defendant.2 But when the government’s witnesses are 
police officers, the converse is true. 
Police officers testify frequently in criminal cases.3 In a surprising 
number of these cases, the police officer is not the investigator or person 
who responded to a report of crime—what many might conceive of as 
typical witness roles for police officers—but instead the complainant or 
accuser.4 Consider, for example, a case where the defendant is accused of 
resisting arrest,5 or assaulting a police officer,6 or even a simple drug 
possession charge where a police officer claims to have patted down the 
defendant and found a controlled substance on the defendant’s person.7 In 
any of these all-too-common scenarios, the defendant will have virtually 
no chance of winning at trial unless the defendant can cast doubt on the 
credibility of the police officer witness.8 Nonetheless—despite the fact 
                                                     
Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 329–30 (1991)) (describing a 1980s Philadelphia study in 
which slightly more than half of defendants declined to testify); infra section I.B (discussing some of 
the reasons defendants may choose not to testify at trial). 
2. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488 (1978) (stating that the risk of unfair conviction is 
heightened when the trial is “essentially . . . a swearing contest between victim and accused”). 
3. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 102 (2009) (noting 
that one of a prosecutor’s primary responsibilities is “to make the judge and jury believe the police”); 
JONATHAN SUAREZ, POLICE OFFICER EXAM 50 (2d ed. 2003) (testifying in court is an important part 
of a police officer’s job). 
4. For just a few summaries of cases where police officers claimed to be victims, see, e.g., John M. 
Burkoff, Aggravated Assault—Case Law—Aggravated Assault on Police Officer, in 14 WEST’S PA. 
PRAC. SERIES § 1:184 (6th ed. 2018) (summarizing cases involving claims of aggravated assault on 
police officers); Annotation, What Constitutes Offense of Obstructing or Resisting Officer, 48 A. L. R. 
746 (1927) (summarizing cases involving offenses against an arresting officer); 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault 
and Battery § 30 (2017) (summarizing cases where alleged victim was on-duty police officer). 
5. E.g., Fallon v. State, 221 P.3d 1016, 1017 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (defendant convicted of 
resisting arrest, where sole testimony regarding the incident came from police officer who claimed 
defendant resisted arrest). 
6. E.g., Foster v. United States, 136 A.3d 330, 332 (D.C. Ct. App. 2016) (defendant convicted of 
assaulting a police officer, where sole testimony regarding the incident came from police officers who 
claimed to have been assaulted). 
7. E.g., People v. Minniweather, 703 N.E.2d 912, 913 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998) (defendant convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance, where sole testimony regarding the drug possession came from 
police officers). 
8. E.g., Robinson v. State, 730 A.2d 181, 196 (Md. 1999) (discussing a defendant convicted in case 
that amounted to credibility contest between police officers and defendant, who provided markedly 
different versions of events); see Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police 
Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 746 (2015) 
(labeling a criminal defendant’s ability to access materials that could cast doubt on an officer’s 
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that the phenomenon of police officers lying at trial is so well documented 
that it has its own euphemism, “testilying”9—the law imposes tremendous 
obstacles to defense counsel obtaining and utilizing evidence about the 
officer that would cast doubt on the officer’s credibility. Such evidence 
could come in the form of records showing that the police officer has 
previously lied in other cases, has a history of using excessive force on 
civilians, or charges defendants with resisting arrest at a far higher rate 
than other officers in the department. The legal obstacles to defense 
counsel obtaining such information manifest themselves in both the 
absence of records—our legal system is reluctant to require that police 
departments or prosecutors’ offices document police misconduct—and 
the inability of defense counsel to access and use the records that are 
deemed confidential in the majority of jurisdictions.10 
The thesis of this Article is that, when it comes to helping a jury assess 
the credibility of defendants versus police officer witnesses, the law gets 
it backward. On the one hand, our data collection systems and evidentiary 
doctrines allow the government nearly instant access to a defendant’s 
entire history of encounters with the law,11 disincentivize defendants from 
testifying on their own behalf,12 and give prosecutors myriad means to 
introduce evidence suggesting that the defendant is, based on prior 
misdeeds, more likely to be guilty of the charged crime.13 On the other 
                                                     
credibility a matter of “life and death”); Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police 
Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 466 (2004) (“When it comes down to whose story to 
believe—the criminal suspect or the police officer—in situations unlikely to involve other witnesses, 
the officer has a distinct advantage.”); Lauren Ouziel, Beyond Law and Fact: Jury Evaluation of Law 
Enforcement, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 697 (2016) (the conduct of judges and prosecutors 
indicates agreement that “juror assessment of reasonable doubt is tied up in assessments of law 
enforcement’s conduct”).  
9. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 870 (2008) (noting that 
police lies are “pervasive” and undercharged); see also Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach 
the Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 
211 (2000) (theorizing that an officer is more likely to be “struck by lightning” than charged with 
perjury); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1037, 1040 (1996) (“[L]ying intended to convict the guilty . . . is so common and so accepted 
in some jurisdictions that the police themselves have come up with a name for it: ‘testilying.’”); 
Joseph Goldstein, ‘Testilying’ by Police: A Stubborn Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/nyregion/testilying-police-perjury-new-
york.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=photo-spot-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
10. See infra Part II. 
11. See infra section I.A. 
12. FED. R. EVID. 609; see infra section I.B. 
13. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); FED. R. EVID. 413–15; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Second 
Coming of Res Gestae: A Procedural Approach to Untangling the “Inextricably Intertwined” Theory 
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hand, the law perversely prevents defendants from casting doubt on the 
credibility of police officers by making police misconduct records 
confidential and, in many cases, inaccessible to defendants.14 This 
unequal distribution of access and ability to utilize information creates 
trials where the jury is exposed to extensive evidence suggesting the 
accused is not credible, but remains naïve to any reasons to question the 
credibility of the defendant’s primary accuser, the police officer.15 
Several scholars have produced compelling critiques of the way our 
current evidentiary doctrines invite juror suspicion of defendants and 
discourage defendants from testifying at their own trials.16 Others have 
examined the prosecutorial and procedural favoritism police officers 
enjoy when they are suspects in criminal cases,17 and the extreme 
reluctance of courts to find officers criminally or civilly liable for 
misconduct on the job.18 But very few have addressed the way this 
favoritism reveals itself when police officers are complainants or 
witnesses in criminal cases. This Article provides a novel contribution to 
the scholarly literature by exposing the particularly problematic 
imbalances that result when the government is not only prosecuting a 
defendant, but also acting as a defendant’s primary accuser. When the law 
allows prosecutors to access and introduce evidence casting doubt on a 
                                                     
for Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 719, 728–30 
(2010); infra section I.C–D. 
14. See infra Part II. 
15. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 1, at 1459–60 (permitting the government to elicit evidence of a 
defendant’s prior convictions or other bad acts may “dissuade the jury from hearing the substance of 
the defendant’s story, from having sympathy with the defendant, or from disbelieving the 
government”).  
16. See, e.g., id.; Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique 
of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 524 (2009) (critiquing the racial biases 
inherent in rules permitting impeachment of defendants); Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior 
Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 1980 (2016) [hereinafter Roberts, Conviction by Prior 
Impeachment] (noting that evidentiary rules permitting prosecutors to impeach defendants “make[ ] 
it easier for prosecutors to win cases”); William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. 
REV. 329, 361 (1995) (commenting that the “sweeping rhetoric” of the presumption of innocence 
“continues in the face of practices that are inconsistent with its premises and promises”). 
17. See Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1201, 1206 (2016); Kate Levine, 
Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447 (2016); Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, 
Erwin Chemerinsky: Police Dodge Accountability for Deaths, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Dec. 7, 2014, 
12:00 AM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/police-644400-officers-jury.html 
[https://perma.cc/3D3G-FNQ9]. 
18. See Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995 
(2017); Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953 (2017); David A. Sklansky, Traffic 
Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 298 
(1997); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 971 (1999).  
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defendant’s credibility, and conversely prevents defendants from 
obtaining or using evidence that could disprove the credibility of police 
officers, the resulting imbalances tip the metaphorical scales of justice 
heavily in the government’s favor. 
The specific manifestations of partiality toward police officers that this 
Article explores, and the resulting inequities they create in criminal trials, 
are natural outgrowths of the deference our criminal system has long 
afforded government actors. From a philosophical viewpoint, this Article 
falls within a rich tradition of scholarly literature critiquing the many ways 
the American criminal justice system venerates law enforcement and 
represses people of color, enabling societal ills like mass incarceration and 
a tremendously costly, ineffectual War on Drugs.19 The context this 
Article addresses—cases where police officers are not only charging the 
defendant, but also acting as the defendant’s principal accuser—is 
particularly vulnerable to governmental abuse and unfair outcomes for the 
people of color who are most likely to be targets of law enforcement 
suspicion.20 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the technological 
resources, data-keeping systems, and evidentiary doctrines that 
collectively permit the government to access and use extensive collateral 
evidence to attack the character and credibility of criminal defendants at 
                                                     
19. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1827, 1883 (2015) (discussing how courts “all too readily defer” to the judgments of police officers); 
Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-
Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 149 (2002) (“Courts regularly presume that 
apprehending officers operate solely out of good motives and the desire to achieve fairness; however, 
evidence shows that in high-crime areas, this presumption is often false.”); Robin K. Magee, The 
Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: 
Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151, 154–55 (1994) (discussing 
how in cases involving claims of police brutality against a black man, “[t]he playing field is unevenly 
tilted in favor of the police officer . . . the Supreme Court has fostered and promoted a paradigm that 
has privileged the often white police officer with a presumption of innocence”); Moran, supra note 
18; Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 407, 409 (2013) (citing numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases where the Court was 
faced with condemning or deferring to police officers’ judgment, and chose to defer to the officers). 
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010). 
20. See ALEXANDER, supra note 19, at 20–58 (discussing the historic subjugation of African 
Americans by those in power in the United States); Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 245 (2010) (discussing how one of the traditional functions of police officers 
has been to create “‘white only’ space”); Linda S. Greene, Before and After Michael Brown—Toward 
an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 9–13 (2015) (discussing the 
United States’ history of racialized violence inflicted by, or with the support of, the government 
against racial minorities); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor 
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 659–60 (1994) (“being stopped for nothing—or almost 
nothing—has become an all-too-common experience” for African Americans and Hispanics); 
Sklansky, supra note 18, at 313–15 (describing the “distinct[ive]ly different” and humiliating way 
police officers tend to treat people of color during traffic stops).  
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trial. Part II articulates how, in contrast to the ease with which prosecutors 
can access information about criminal defendants, our criminal system 
actively prevents defendants from obtaining and using evidence that 
would diminish the credibility of police officer witnesses. 
Lastly, Part III provides recommendations for reform in three areas: 
(1) the lack of requirements for rigorous recordkeeping and accurate data 
pertaining to police misconduct; (2) the laws that prevent defense counsel 
from accessing and utilizing police misconduct records that do exist; and 
(3) the evidentiary rules and practices that permit governments to access 
and utilize other acts and character evidence against defendants. In 
Part III, I propose a model statute that jurisdictions can employ as a tool 
for ascertaining when and how to disclose police misconduct records in 
criminal cases, as well as specific amendments to existing federal and 
state evidentiary doctrines. 
I. GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO AND USE OF DEFENDANTS’ 
PRIOR HISTORY 
Defendants in the American criminal justice system face prosecutors 
who have ample collateral means to attack both their credibility, if the 
defendants testify, and their innocent character, if they do not. As soon as 
a defendant is charged with—or even suspected of—a crime, the 
machinery of the government begins digging into the defendant’s past. 
Police officers and prosecutors can learn, with a few clicks of a button, 
whether the defendant has ever been convicted, charged, or even merely 
arrested for any prior crimes.21 With a bit more effort, the government can 
access police reports pertaining to these prior arrests or charges, which 
include names and addresses of witnesses to the prior allegations, 
photographs, and statements made by the defendant.22 If inter alia, the 
defendant is a suspected gang member or terrorist,23 “immigration 
violator,”24 or the subject of a protective order,25 the government can also 
quickly find out if the defendant is believed to be “violent toward law 
                                                     
21. See National Data Exchange (N-Dex) System, CRIM. JUSTICE INFO. SERVS., FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ndex [https://perma.cc/CL6C-WWVC].  
22. Id. 
23. See National Crime Information Center (NCIC), CRIM. JUSTICE INFO. SERVS., FED. BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION [hereinafter NCIC], https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ncic 
[https://perma.cc/C9KK-QQFC]. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
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enforcement,”26 has a warrant out for arrest in another state or country,27 
has been denied an attempt to purchase a gun,28 was charged with an 
offense as a juvenile delinquent,29 or was a party to divorce proceedings, 
a landlord-tenant dispute, or other civil cases.30 The government’s access 
is not limited to incidents reported in the same jurisdiction as the charged 
crime; the defendant’s history, both civil and criminal, is an open book for 
law enforcement virtually anywhere in the country.31 
The law affords the government a variety of means to use this 
information against the defendant at trial, as collateral evidence helping 
the prosecution prove the defendant guilty of the charged offense.32 In 
some cases, evidence of a defendant’s prior history is elicited under the 
guise of proving, for example, the defendant’s “motive” or “intent” to 
commit the crime,33 or arguing that the defendant is simply less believable 
because of a criminal history.34 Juries are also allowed to hear evidence of 
other misconduct by the defendant in order to help them understand the 
“context” of the charged crime.35 Nearly all of these doctrines allow the 
government to introduce evidence of criminal allegations that were never 
charged, let alone proven beyond a reasonable doubt.36 
                                                     
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Includable Offenses, 28 C.F.R. § 20.32 (2004); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, USE & MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE 
REPORT 2, 23 (1993), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/CCHUSE.PDF [https://perma.cc/3WZC-
8BXX]. 
30.  See, e.g., Colorado Courts Record Search, LEXISNEXIS, 
https://www.cocourts.com/cocourts/secure/authenticated/Search.xhtml [https://perma.cc/FCG9-
JKGQ] (showing a Colorado state court records search, permitting requester to search records of all 
criminal, civil, small claims, domestic, and traffic cases involving any named individual); Magisterial 
District Court Docket Sheets, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. OF PA. WEB PORTAL, 
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/MDJ.aspx [https://perma.cc/9G6L-DV8L] (showing a 
Pennsylvania state court public records search, allowing participants to search for all state cases by 
participant name); District and Municipal Court Case Search, WASH. COURTS, 
https://dw.courts.wa.gov/index.cfm?fa=home.cljsearchName&terms=accept&flashform=0 
[https://perma.cc/6R7Q-MZ4D] (showing a Washington state court public records search, disclosing 
all district or municipal cases involving any specified individual). 
31. See NCIC, supra note 23. 
32. Supra notes 12–13. 
33. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
34. See FED. R. EVID. 609. 
35. E.g., People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Colo. 1994) (allowing the introduction of 
evidence that was not part of the criminal “transaction” to provide the fact-finder with a complete 
understanding of the events surrounding the crime). 
36. Compare FED. R. EVID. 609 (permitting the government to use prior convictions to impeach 
defendant’s credibility), with FED. R. EVID. 404, 413–15, 608 (permitting the government to introduce 
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Collateral evidence about a defendant’s history or character is an 
enormously powerful tool for the government to persuade jurors that the 
defendant is guilty of the charged offense. Courts have long recognized 
that jurors are “over persuaded”37 by evidence of a defendant’s prior 
history, and are less likely to believe or presume the defendant innocent if 
they hear damning evidence about the defendant’s past.38 Instead, jurors 
who learn about a defendant’s criminal history or poor character are much 
more likely to jump to the conclusion that, because the defendant has done 
something bad in the past, the defendant is a bad person and necessarily 
more likely to have committed the charged crime.39 That, as one court has 
noted, is “of course . . . why the prosecution uses such evidence whenever 
it can.”40 
Part I of this Article details the methods by which the law tracks 
defendants’ every encounter with the legal system and then affords 
prosecutors the ability to both access and use their prior history as 
evidence that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense. I begin by 
discussing the expansions in recordkeeping over the past several decades, 
and then progress through the major rules and doctrines that enable the 
government to use these records as evidence of guilt at trial. 
A. Expanding Government Access to Defendants’ Prior History 
One consequence of the technology revolution in the past several 
decades has been a drastic expansion in the government’s ability to access 
evidence about a defendant’s criminal history. When this country’s legal 
                                                     
evidence bearing on defendants’ credibility or character, without requiring the evidence to be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
37. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948). 
38. See id. at 476; United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that evidence 
of a defendant’s “bad” past is “inherently damaging” to the defendant at trial); United States v. Myers, 
550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293–94 (N.Y. 1901) (finding 
that the prohibition on propensity evidence exists because such evidence detracts from the 
presumption of innocence). 
39. E.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that propensity evidence contradicts the presumption of innocence); Myers, 
550 F.2d at 1044; see also Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475–76; People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 
(N.Y. 1930) (both juries and judges are heavily persuaded by propensity evidence); JOHN H. 
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 58.2, at 1212 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing the tendency for jurors 
to rely on propensity evidence when deciding to convict). 
40. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (labeling the 
idea that jurors will disregard their biases when instructed to do so an “unmitigated fiction”); see also 
United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Peden, 961 F.2d 517, 
520 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that even when a jury is unsure about the States’ evidence as to the charged 
offense, they will likely convict if they believe the defendant to be a bad person). 
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system was founded, technology was, to state the obvious, vastly more 
limited than it is now. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century prosecutors had 
no access to computers, let alone national databases that instantly recall 
and compile information on every criminal charge or arrest a defendant 
has ever faced. Fingerprint registries did not yet exist.41 Even leading into 
the latter third of the twentieth century, prosecutors had limited means of 
learning about a defendant’s prior history, absent some widespread 
notoriety on the defendant’s part.42 
Today’s prosecutors operate in a very different world. In 1971, the 
National Crime Information Center began using computers to store 
criminal history data and files from both state and federal criminal cases.43 
In 1983, the Federal Bureau of Investigation debuted the Interstate 
Identification Index, which serves as a unified compendium allowing law 
enforcement access to both state and criminal justice records.44 In the 
1990s, after passage of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (the 
Brady Act),45 Congress established the National Criminal History 
Improvement Program, which provided financial assistance to states 
seeking to improve their criminal record databases.46 The 2002 E-
Government Act,47 in turn, required federal agencies and courts to make 
criminal records available and accessible online to third parties.48 Even 
                                                     
41. See Fingerprint America History, FINGERPRINT AMERICA, 
https://fingerprintamerica.com/about/ [https://perma.cc.R7YF-3J3D] (tracing the first fingerprint 
repositories to the early twentieth century). 
42. See infra notes 43–52 (discussing the development of new electronic databases, beginning in 
the 1970s, that gave prosecutors increasingly greater access to information about defendants). 
43. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF 
CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, 2001 UPDATE 27 (2001), 
http:// www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/umchri01.pdf [https://perma.cc/95GN-QTFW]. 
44. See Central Segment, NCIC 2000 (Fed. Bureau of Investigation, D.C.) Apr.–May 1996, 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3213/2kv1n3.htm [https://perma.cc/67DT-ECMG] (describing 
how the Interstate Identification Index was operationalized); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/GGD-85-4, OBSERVATIONS ON THE FBI’S INTERSTATE IDENTIFICATION INDEX 2–3 (1984), 
http://archive.gao.gov/d6t1/125400.pdf [https://perma.cc/CRF3-73J7]; National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC), FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Jun. 2, 2008), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm [https://perma.cc/6SST-75G7]. 
45. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 925A, Pub. L. 103-159, Title I (1993).  
46. See National Criminal History Improvement Program, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=47 [https://perma.cc/5AQJ-Y6DE]; National 
Criminal History Improvement Program, R.I. PUB. SAFETY GRANT ADMIN. OFFICE, 
http://psga.ri.gov/grants/nchip.php [https://perma.cc/VMG8-KKFE]. 
47. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913–14 (codified as 
amended, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000)). 
48. Id.  
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juvenile offenses, once considered confidential, are included in the FBI’s 
Interstate Identification Index.49 
Many of these laws were enacted in response to public or governmental 
outcry over a particular catastrophic event. The Brady Act, passed after 
the attempted assassination of President Reagan (and murder of James 
Brady, Reagan’s press secretary) by a man with an extensive criminal 
history,50 played a major role in establishing a national criminal 
background check service.51 The 9/11 attacks were another notable 
catalyst for data collection, as the federal government began pouring 
money into state and local agencies for activities such as intelligence 
gathering, surveillance, and data collection of “suspicious” populations.52 
Courts and lawmakers that could have served as a check on law 
enforcement officials instead have increasingly empowered law 
enforcement to engage in questionable surveillance activities.53 As 
                                                     
49. See Includable Offenses, 28 C.F.R. § 20.32 (2004). On July 15, 1992, the Department of Justice 
amended this section to include juvenile offenses. See Authorization of Inclusion of Juvenile Records 
in the FBI Criminal History Information System, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,315 (Jul. 15, 1992) (codified at 28 
C.F.R. § 20.32(b)). The amended regulation requests submission of “serious and/or significant adult 
and juvenile offenses.” 28 C.F.R. § 20.32(a).  
50. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 925A, Pub. L. 103-159, Title I (1993); 
see also Jim and Sarah Brady, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/jim-and-sarah-brady [https://perma.cc/642S-JV3A]. 
51. See National Instant Criminal Background Check System Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,303 
(Oct. 30, 1998) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 25) (implementing the NICS pursuant to the Brady Act). 
52. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces More Than $1.3 Billion in 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Preparedness Grant Awards (June 29, 2012), 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/29/dhs-announces-more-13-billion-fiscal-year-fy-2012-
preparedness-grant-awards [https://perma.cc/2QV5-TMCC]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., DHS Announces More Than $2.1 Billion in Preparedness Grants (Aug. 23, 2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/08/23/dhs-announces-more-21-billion-preparedness-grants 
[https://perma.cc/QG5N-QL8T] (announcing the allocation of “approximately $35 billion” in grants 
for the years spanning 2002–2011). One example of this was the Los Angeles Police Departments’ 
efforts to collect intelligence on the local Muslim community. See Michael P. Downing, Statement 
Before the Committee on Homeland Security’s [sic] and Governmental Affairs United States Senate, 
L.A. POLICE DEP’T (Oct. 30, 2007), 
http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Michael%20DowningTestimonyfortheU.S.Senate-Final.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/AV77-TNAE]; Richard Winton et al., LAPD Defends Muslim Mapping Effort, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 10, 2007), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-lapd10nov10-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/48WF-DPKH].  
53. See, e.g., Khaled A. Beydoun, Boxed In: Reclassification of Arab Americans on the U.S. Census 
as Progress or Peril?, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 693, 699–701 (2016) (discussing enhanced governmental 
surveillance of Middle Eastern, North African, and Muslim communities after 9/11); Nuzhat 
Chowdhury, Note, I, Spy (but Only on You): Raza v. City of New York, the Civil Rights Disaster of 
Religious & Ethnic-Based Surveillance, and the National Security Excuse, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 278, 279 (2015) (lamenting the increased deference that lawmakers have afforded law 
enforcement agents surveilling Muslim populations after 9/11); Carlos Torres et al., Indiscriminate 
Power: Racial Profiling and Surveillance Since 9/11, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 293–96 
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technology has advanced and the government’s thirst for obtaining and 
recording personal information remains unsated, both state and federal 
government agencies have vastly expanded their collection and reporting 
of criminal history data.54 
Now, when a defendant is charged with a crime, a prosecutor need only 
enter the defendant’s name and date of birth into a statewide or national 
database, which will produce every court case in which the person has 
ever been named as a defendant, with the possible exception of very minor 
municipal offenses.55 If the defendant was arrested and fingerprinted prior 
to charging, those fingerprints are run through a registry that produces 
every prior arrest attributable to the same fingerprints.56 The government 
can access this information regardless of whether the arrest or charge was 
dismissed and, in some jurisdictions, even if the charges against the 
defendant were sealed or expunged.57 State and national databases also 
track civil contacts with the judicial system, including lawsuits, divorce 
filings, immigration violations, and child custody disputes.58 Before even 
making a charging decision in most cases, the government has at its 
disposal an entire lifetime of the defendant’s encounters with the legal 
                                                     
(2015) (detailing the FBI and NYPD’s largely-unchecked “blatant . . . racial profiling” of Middle 
Easterners after 9/11); Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, 
Terror Cases, ASSOC. PRESS (Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2012/nypd-
muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror-cases [https://perma.cc/FNR9-WHVQ]. 
54. See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal 
Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 178 (2008); Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine, and 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 804–09 (2010) (discussing the rapid 
expansion of criminal justice databases beginning approximately thirty years ago); Joy Radice, The 
Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1319 (2017) (noting that United States’ criminal history 
databases now hold more than one-hundred million records).  
55. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE 
CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249799.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4NU-F5Y8]; Criminal 
History Records Search, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. http://www.courts.state.ny.us/apps/chrs 
[https://perma.cc/LN2G-KNCZ]; CourtVIEW, http://www.ashlandcountycpcourt.org 
[https://perma.cc/SEC5-G3YW] (database for Ashland County, Ohio, Common Pleas Court). 
56. See Privacy Impact Assessment Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
National Security Enhancements, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis.htm [https://perma.cc/LPB3-WUP6]. The Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) is a national fingerprint and criminal history system that 
contains information submitted by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Id.; BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 55. 
57. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-702(e) (2017) (permitting a prosecutor to request information 
about sealed criminal records); MINN. STAT. § 609A.03, subd. 7(b)(3) (2017) ( “Upon request by law 
enforcement, prosecution, or corrections authorities, an agency or jurisdiction subject to an 
expungement order shall inform the requester of the existence of a sealed record and of the right to 
obtain access to it . . . .”). 
58. See supra notes 30, 55. 
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system and can begin strategizing about which of that information it 
wishes to introduce at trial.59 
B. Provisions Allowing Prosecutors to Admit Defendants’ Prior 
Convictions 
Many defendants have prior convictions.60 A 2006 study of the 
seventy-five largest counties in the country revealed that 43% of 
defendants facing felony charges already had felony convictions.61 
Numerous empiricists have concluded that jurors who hear about a 
defendant’s prior convictions are more likely to convict the defendant and 
use the information for the (ostensibly impermissible) purpose of inferring 
that the defendant committed the charged crime.62 At least one older study 
found that admitting evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction in a jury 
trial increased the rate of conviction for the charged offense by 27%.63 
Simply put, when jurors hear about a defendant’s prior conviction, they 
are less likely to find the defendant credible. To exacerbate the problem, 
defendants with prior convictions are also significantly less likely to 
testify at trial if their convictions will be admitted against them.64 This is 
a further boon to the government, because statistics show that many jurors 
                                                     
59. Although not the subject of this piece, information about the defendant’s prior history also has 
enormous effect on, inter alia, what the defendant is charged with and what plea offers the 
government might extend. See, e.g., Ouziel, supra note 8, at 702–03. 
60. See Thomas H. Cohen & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 
2006, BUREAU OF JUST STAT.: BULL. 1–2 (July 15, 2010), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZMW-URLL]. 
61. Id. 
62. E.g., Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant’s Previous 
Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 738 (2000); Michael J. Saks, What 
Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
3, 26 (1997). But see Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes 
Evidence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493 
(2013) (arguing that the hypothesis that prior convictions affect a jury’s verdict is not proven). 
63. See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons 
from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 487 n.39 (2008) (citing HARRY 
KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)). 
64. See Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony: Prior Conviction 
Impeachment and the Fight Against Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 836–37 (2016) 
[hereinafter Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony] (citing Blume, supra 
note 63, at 491) (citing a study showing that defendants with prior convictions frequently waive their 
right to testify at trial because they fear being impeached with their prior conviction, and that 
informing jurors of the prior conviction increases the likelihood of conviction at trial). 
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expect defendants to tell their side of the story and assume defendants who 
do not testify probably are not innocent.65 
Scholars and courts since at least the 1940s have recognized that 
admission of prior convictions is deeply damaging to a defendant’s 
chances of being found not guilty at trial.66 Nonetheless, despite the 
damning effect of a prior conviction on the defendant’s chance for a fair 
trial, our evidentiary doctrines persist in providing prosecutors a wide 
array of means to admit just that.67 In federal court, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609 governs impeachment by prior conviction, and allows the 
government to impeach criminal defendants with two types of 
convictions.68 The first are convictions involving dishonesty. Under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), any conviction involving a 
“dishonest act or false statement” must be admitted for impeachment 
purposes if the defendant testifies.69 This rule applies to convictions for 
both felonies and misdemeanors, and requires admission without any 
further assessment of probative value or prejudice to the defendant.70 
                                                     
65. See generally Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony, supra note 
64, at 838–39 (citing research suggesting that jurors tend to assume the guilt of defendants based on 
destructive and often racialized stereotypes of criminality, but are less likely to rely on stereotypes if 
the defendant personally testifies); Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense 
Counsel Overcome Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the Criminal Justice System?, 45 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 315, 358 (2012) (utilizing empirical evidence to prove the point that “despite the presumption 
of innocence, most jurors believe that those accused of crime are probably guilty, ought to testify if 
they are not, and bear the burden of proving their innocence”). 
66. E.g., United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384, 1389 (10th Cir. 1978) (“[A]n obvious truth is 
that once prior convictions are introduced the trial is, for all practical purposes, completed and the 
guilty outcome follows as a mere formality.”); United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 
1972) (noting “a growing number of judges and commentators” criticizing the practice of permitting 
prior conviction evidence to impeach defendants); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967) (expressing concern that defendants with prior convictions may “not testify out of fear of 
being prejudiced because of impeachment . . . .”); Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with FRE 
Rule 609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 21–
22 (1999); Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and 
a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 688 (1991) (arguing for abrogation of Rule 609); 
Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 63, at 161 (noting that when defendant has a record of prior convictions, 
acquittal by jury is far less likely than when defendant has no record of prior crimes); Mason Ladd, 
Credibility Tests—Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 186 (1940) (positing that a defendant 
impeached by a prior conviction may be “overwhelmed with prejudice”). 
67. The Federal Rules of Evidence were first proposed in 1972 and enacted in 1975. See FED. R. 
EVID. 101, 1101. At that time, courts had far less experience with or access to extensive national 
databases of defendants’ prior misdeeds, and the promulgators of the Federal Rules may not have 
envisioned how frequently prosecutors would have access to and attempt to use evidence of past 
misconduct. 
68. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
69. Id. at (a)(2). 
70. Id.  
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Courts take an expansive view of the definition of “dishonest act”: in some 
jurisdictions, convictions for theft or shoplifting are per se crimes of 
dishonesty regardless of the underlying facts.71 Others have interpreted 
the phrase “dishonest act” to include, among other things, burglary72 and 
distribution of controlled substances.73 
The second class of prior convictions admissible under federal law are 
felonies punishable by at least one year in prison.74 Felony convictions 
within the last ten years (measured by date of conviction or release from 
custody, whichever is later), must be admitted as long as the court finds 
that the probative value of the conviction outweighs the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant.75 If more than ten years have passed since the 
defendant’s conviction or release from custody, courts should admit the 
conviction if the probative value “substantially” outweighs the prejudicial 
effect.76 Here too, courts consistently take an expansive view of the kinds 
of convictions that have probative value: federal courts have found that 
the government properly “impeached” defendants accused of murder with 
prior murder convictions, bank robbery with prior bank robbery 
convictions, and possession of firearms with convictions for the same 
crime.77 
Every state except one allows the government to impeach defendants 
with evidence of their prior convictions,78 and many employ rules similar 
or identical to Federal Rule 609.79 Some states take an even more generous 
approach to admitting prior convictions. In Colorado, for example, any 
felony conviction, regardless of the age of conviction or type of offense, 
is admissible for impeachment purposes if the defendant testifies.80 In 
                                                     
71. E.g., State v. Ray, 116 Wash. 2d 531, 545, 806 P.2d 1220, 1228 (1991) (overruling prior, 
narrower definition of crime of dishonesty propounded in State v. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d 1, 676 P.2d 
975 (1984)). 
72. United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir. 1979) (concluding that a burglary 
conviction has “a definite bearing on honesty which is directly related to credibility”). 
73. United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the trial court properly 
recognized the “secrecy and dissembling” involved in trafficking narcotics). 
74. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 609(b). 
77. See Edward E. Gainor, Note, Character Evidence by Any Other Name . . . : A Proposal to Limit 
Impeachment by Prior Conviction Under Rule 609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762, 779–80 (1990) 
(citing numerous cases for these points). 
78. The only state that does not allow prior convictions to be used for impeachment of defendants 
under any circumstances is Montana. See MONT. R. EVID. 609. 
79. E.g., ME. R. EVID. 609; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-609; N.M.R. EVID. 11-609; see also Blume, 
supra note 63, at 491; Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, supra note 16, at 1980.  
80. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-101 (2017). 
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California, the government may impeach a testifying defendant with any 
felony conviction involving “moral turpitude,” regardless of whether it 
was a crime of dishonesty.81 
Even when courts are required to perform a balancing test before 
admitting a defendant’s conviction, that test frequently balances out in 
favor of admitting the prior conviction. Professor Anna Roberts has noted 
that, though in earlier decades courts tended to permit prior convictions 
only after carefully weighing their probative value against a possible 
chilling effect on the defendant’s testimony, today’s courts are far more 
likely to admit the prior conviction, with little or no meaningful analysis 
of how it might prejudice the defendant’s case or detract from the 
defendant’s ability to testify.82 Other studies and commentators support 
the conclusion that, for the majority of judges, the default rule is to allow 
the government to admit a defendant’s prior conviction.83 One explanation 
for this is that, despite the presumption of innocence, most players in the 
criminal system—judges included—start with a working hypothesis that 
the defendant is guilty, and, intentionally or not, are likely to interpret 
information (such as a prior conviction) in a way that supports this initial 
hypothesis.84 
The result of the judiciary’s over-reliance on Rule 609 is a Hobson’s 
choice for the defendant. The defendant can testify and allow the jury to 
hear about the prior conviction, in which case the jury is more likely to 
convict based on their belief that the defendant is a bad person.85 
Alternatively, the defendant can decline to testify and prevent the jury 
from learning of the prior conviction, in which case the jury is more likely 
to convict based on their belief that the defendant would testify if truly 
innocent.86 Either way, the jury is less likely to treat the defendant as a 
                                                     
81. People v. Edwards, 306 P.3d 1049, 1101 (Cal. 2013). 
82. See Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony, supra note 64, at 837–
38 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1489 (9th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Nururdin, 8 F.3d 1187, 1192 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 297–98 (4th 
Cir. 1992)). 
83. See United States v. Pettiford, 238 F.R.D. 33, 42 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting “the general trend 
towards admissibility” of prior convictions). KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42 
at 95 (7th ed. 2013) (noting that most judges side with prosecutors in permitting admission of prior 
convictions); Blume, supra note 63, at 484, 490–91 (discussing how judges’ balancing tests routinely 
play out in favor of the government admitting the prior conviction).  
84. E.g., Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 314 (2006). 
85. Blume, supra note 63, at 487 n.39. 
86. Taslitz, supra note 65, at 358. Though not the subject of this paper, other scholars have done 
excellent work pointing out the damage that silencing defendants does in contexts beyond the question 
of guilt or innocence. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 1. 
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presumptively innocent person, and more likely to decide any credibility 
contest in favor of the government. 
C. Rules Allowing Prosecutors to Admit Other Acts as Evidence 
Even if a defendant does not testify at trial, the defendant’s prior 
convictions—or other “acts” that do not result in conviction—may be 
admissible as proof that the defendant is the person who committed the 
charged crime. Exposing jurors to other acts evidence “greatly increases” 
the likelihood that the jury will convict the defendant of the charged 
crime.87 Nonetheless, courts admit this evidence on a regular basis, 
primarily pursuant to Rule of Evidence 404(b).88 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), upon which many state rules are also 
patterned,89 provides in relevant part: 
 
(b)  Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts. 
 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act 
is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to 
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character. 
 
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. [Evidence of 
a crime, wrong, or other act] may be admissible for 
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident. On request by a defendant in 
a criminal case, the prosecutor must: 
 
(A) Provide reasonable notice of the general nature of 
any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer 
at trial; and 
 
                                                     
87. See Erin R. Collins, The Evidentiary Rules of Engagement in the War Against Domestic 
Violence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397, 444 (2015) (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dispute over the 
Doctrine of Chances, 7 CRIM. JUSTICE 16, 21 (1992)). 
88. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
89. See, e.g., COLO. R. EVID. 404(b) (adopting an identical or very similar version of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 404(b)); ILL. ST. EVID. R. 404(b); TEX. EVID. R. 404(b) (same). 
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(B) do so before trial—or during trial if the court, for 
good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.90 
 
In theory, Rule 404(b)(1), commonly referred to as the prohibition on 
use of “propensity” evidence, protects the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
by preventing the government from introducing evidence solely for the 
sake of showing that the defendant is a person of bad character who acted 
in conformity with this character by committing the charged offense.91 
However, the permitted uses of other acts evidence identified in 404(b)(2), 
and the expansive way courts have interpreted 404(b)(2), have given the 
government ample means to introduce evidence of defendants’ histories 
of bad acts.92 
Rule 404(b)(2) allows the government broad leeway to introduce any 
other act by the defendant—regardless of whether it resulted in 
conviction, or whether it was a crime at all—to prove a laundry list of 
damning allegations about a defendant, including that the defendant had 
the motive, intent, or knowledge to commit the charged crime; that the 
defendant prepared or planned or had an opportunity to commit the crime; 
that the crime was not a mistake or accident; and that the defendant is the 
person who committed the crime.93 The Rule’s text contains no standard 
for assessing whether the evidence should be admitted, and no burden on 
the moving party to prove why the evidence is relevant or reliable.94 
In the absence of any textual standards, courts have generally taken lax 
and inconsistent approaches to the standard that must be met for 
admission of this evidence. Some jurisdictions place a burden on the 
moving party to establish that the other acts evidence is admissible for a 
non-propensity purpose, but do not specify what that burden is.95 Others 
allow the movant to introduce other acts evidence as long as the jury can 
                                                     
90. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
91. Id. at (b)(1); see United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2014). 
92. See Daniel D. Blinka, Character, Liberalism, and the Protean Culture of Evidence Law, 37 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 87. 110–12 (2013) (commenting on the ease with which a creative prosecutor 
can introduce character evidence under the guise of 404(b)); Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 721 
(stating that prosecutors use other acts evidence with “great frequency” because it is so powerful in 
persuading the jury to convict); David A. Sonenshein, The Misuse of Rule 404(b) on the Issue of Intent 
in the Federal Courts, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 215, 219 (2011) (discussing how in the past two 
decades, federal courts have expanded their admission of other acts evidence, and admission is now 
the default rule). 
93. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
94. Id. 
95. E.g., United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 260 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that the government 
“must establish that evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is admissible for a proper, non-propensity 
purpose”). 
12 - Moran.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:49 PM 
2018] CONTESTING POLICE CREDIBILITY 1357 
 
conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the other act occurred, 
but do not require judges to make the preponderance determination prior 
to trial.96 The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected even the easily-satisfied 
preponderance standard; instead, a court may allow other acts evidence at 
trial as long as there is “sufficient evidence to support a finding by the 
jury that the defendant committed the similar act.”97 
Although the rule allows either party to move for admission of other 
acts evidence, it is overwhelmingly employed by the government, the 
party with easy access to information about the defendant’s prior history.98 
Under the guise of Rule 404(b)(2), courts have allowed prosecutors to 
introduce, for example, evidence of a prior murder to prove that the 
defendant had a motive to commit the charged murder,99 and evidence that 
the defendant previously sold cocaine to prove that he intended to sell the 
charged cocaine.100 In practice, such uses are not meaningfully different 
from the propensity evidence that Rule 404(b)(1) purportedly prohibits.101 
The Seventh Circuit has come close to conceding this, holding that 
evidence cannot be excluded even though it may be used to infer 
propensity, as long as it is also admissible for a non-propensity purpose.102 
Although the text of Rule 404(b)(2) is expansive, it is not exhaustive. 
Courts have interpreted the “such as” language in the Rule103 to admit 
other acts evidence for purposes even beyond the nine enumerated in the 
Rule itself, including to rebut a claim of self-defense or explain a 
complainant’s state of mind.104 Prosecutors have also relied on Rule 
                                                     
96. E.g., Gomez, 763 F.3d at 853–54. 
97. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). 
98. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (comment to 1991 amendment) (“[T]he overwhelming number of cases 
[addressing 404(b)(2) evidence] involve introduction of that evidence by the prosecution.”). 
99. E.g., State v. Badgett, 644 S.E.2d 206, 211–12 (N.C. 2007). 
100. E.g., United States v. Perkins, 548 F.3d 510, 514–15 (7th Cir. 2008) (admitting three prior 
cocaine possession or delivery convictions to prove knowledge and intent in charged case); United 
States v. Hearn, 534 F.3d 706, 712–13 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hurn, 496 F.3d 784, 787–88 
(7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Best, 250 F.3d 1084, 1091–93 (7th Cir. 2001); see also United States 
v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that trial court erred in allowing government 
to admit evidence of a defendant’s prior narcotics sales in a prosecution for selling narcotics, but 
acknowledging that the court so routinely allowed such evidence to be admitted that it “may have 
come to seem almost automatic”). 
101. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1); see also State v. Melcher, 678 A.2d 146, 152 (N.H. 1996) (Horton, 
J., dissenting) (prior bad acts evidence admitted to demonstrate the “relationship between the parties” 
was “merely a synonym for propensity”). 
102. United States v. Ferrell, 816 F.3d 433, 444 (7th Cir. 2015). 
103. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act “may be admissible for 
another purpose, such as” proving motive, intent, etc.). 
104. E.g., State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, ¶ 9, 318 P.3d 1151. 
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404(b) to admit evidence of actions that are not crimes at all—for instance, 
the Rule has been used to show a defendant had a strained relationship 
with his family,105 wrote articles about subjects related to the charged 
offense,106 was in an earlier altercation with a government witness in the 
charged case,107 and was a gang member with the nickname “Mafioso.”108 
D. Case Law Allowing Admission of “Res Gestae” or “Inextricably 
Intertwined” Evidence 
Res gestae, a Latin phrase meaning “things done,” is used in law to 
denote, broadly, the events or circumstances pertaining to a particular 
case.109 Courts have defined res gestae evidence as, inter alia, “[e]vidence 
of other offenses or acts that is . . . part of the criminal episode or 
transaction with which the defendant is charged,” used to “provide the 
fact-finder with a full and complete understanding of the events 
surrounding the crime and the context in which the charged crime 
occurred.”110 Other courts define res gestae evidence as that which is 
“inextricably intertwined with evidence regarding the charged offense,”111 
leading some courts and scholars to refer to the doctrine as the 
“inextricably intertwined” doctrine.112 The res gestae doctrine allows the 
government to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence on grounds that 
it is needed to give “context in which a charged crime occurred.”113 
Although the concept of res gestae evidence is not new,114 its expansive 
use is a more recent phenomenon.115 As far back as 1940, Professor 
Wigmore, in his seminal treatise On Evidence, condemned the res gestae 
                                                     
105. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997). 
106. United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520 (11th Cir. 1996). 
107. United States v. Bein, 728 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1984). 
108. United States v. McKay, 431 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2005). 
109. Res Gestae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1501–02 (10th ed. 2014). 
110. People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Colo. 1994). 
111. United States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Killian, 
639 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 726. 
112. Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 726, 728; see also, e.g., State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 
425 (Minn. 2009) (referring to res gestae evidence as “immediate-episode evidence”).  
113. Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1373; see also Ann England & H. Patrick Furman, The Expanding Use 
of the Res Gestae Doctrine, 38 COLO. LAW. 35, 35–36 (2009) (discussing the history and use of the 
res gestae doctrine). 
114. The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the res gestae doctrine in Leeds v. Marine Ins. Co., 
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 380 (1817). 
115. See England & Furman, supra note 113, at 42 (discussing how Colorado state and federal 
courts have “significantly broadened the applicability of the [res gestae] doctrine”); Imwinkelried, 
supra note 13, at 726 (criticizing the expanded use of the doctrine in recent years). 
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doctrine as “positively harmful,” in part because its imprecise precise 
definition invites confusion from the courts and abuse by those seeking to 
admit collateral evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt.116 Seventy years 
later, every federal circuit court recognizes some version of the 
doctrine,117 and several states have enshrined it by statute or rule of 
evidence.118 
When evidence is deemed admissible as res gestae, it is not subject to 
the restrictions of Rule 404(b), because it is theoretically so intertwined 
with the charged offense that it cannot be deemed other acts evidence.119 
In practice, however, it has been found to encompass acts that are not at 
all intertwined with the charged case. Recent courts have used the res 
gestae or inextricably intertwined doctrine to admit evidence in a murder 
case that the defendant had previously threatened to murder other people 
unrelated to the charged offense120; in a perjury trial, that the defendant 
attempted to convince an unrelated witness to lie for him at a prior trial121; 
and in a possession of controlled substance case, that the defendant had 
an outstanding warrant for an unrelated offense.122 Rather than serve as a 
narrow means of admitting evidence closely related to the charged case, 
the res gestae doctrine has too often been employed as an end-run around 
what little protections Rule 404(b) may provide to defendants.123 
                                                     
116. JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1768 (3d ed. 1940); see also United States v. 
Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944) (stating that res gestae should be “denied any place whatever 
in legal terminology”). 
117. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Ford, 613 
F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Concepcion, 316 F. App’x 929, 932 (11th Cir. 
2009) (per curiam); United States v. Gutierrez-Castro, 341 F. App’x 299, 300 (9th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Aldridge, 561 F.3d 759, 766 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011, 1018–
19 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Watkins, 591 F.3d 780, 784–85 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55, 64 (1st Cir. 2009); Wilson v. Vaughn, 533 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir. 
2008); United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 
83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980). But see United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927–29 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(expressing concerns with application of inextricably-intertwined doctrine). 
118. See KY. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (2007); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. 404(B) (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 48.035(3) (2007). 
119. See United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1372 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing United States 
v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1988)); Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 726, 728.  
120. People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373–75 (Colo. 1994). 
121. United States v. Walker, 148 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1998). 
122. People v. Asberry, 172 P.3d 927 (Colo. App. 2007). 
123. See United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927–29 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (criticizing federal courts’ 
expansive use of the inextricably intertwined doctrine and suggesting that such broad use serves little 
purpose other than to give the government an impermissible avenue around the notice requirements 
of Rule 404(b)). 
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The variety of evidentiary doctrines enabling the government to 
introduce a defendant’s criminal history at trial—as well as the databases 
tracking and cataloging a defendant’s every encounter with the law—are 
incredibly powerful tools for the government to cast doubt on the 
defendant’s credibility and theory of defense. In contrast, a defendant’s 
attempts to contest an officer’s credibility are severely hampered by the 
government’s failure to record and collect information relevant to an 
officer’s credibility, as well as the law’s reluctance to provide defendants 
access to the information even when it does exist. 
II. DEFENDANTS’ LACK OF ACCESS TO, AND ABILITY TO 
USE, POLICE OFFICERS’ HISTORY 
While lawmakers have granted prosecutors plentiful means by which 
to access and utilize evidence of a defendant’s past conduct, they have 
conversely gone to great lengths to prevent defense counsel from 
obtaining or using information that could damage the credibility of police 
officer-accusers. Consider the cases discussed in the introduction to this 
Article, where the defendant was accused of resisting arrest, assaulting a 
police officer, possessing narcotics, or any number of other allegations in 
which the police officer’s credibility is the crux of the case against the 
defendant.124 To cast doubt on the officer’s credibility, defense counsel 
will likely want to obtain information not that different from what the 
government already knows about the defendant—whether the police 
officer has a history of misconduct that could be relevant to the officer’s 
credibility at trial. But this kind of information is, in many jurisdictions, 
either extremely difficult or impossible for defense attorneys to obtain and 
use against officers.125 
The legal barriers to defense counsel casting doubt on a police officers’ 
credibility manifest themselves in a variety of ways, which this Article 
breaks down into three essential components: existence, access, and use. 
An initial obstacle to utilizing evidence of police misconduct is that the 
                                                     
124. See Fallon v. State, 221 P.3d 1016, 1017 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010); People v. Minniweather, 
703 N.E.2d 912, 913 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998); Foster v. United States, 136 A.3d 330, 331–32 (D.C. Cir. 
2016). 
125. See infra section II.B; see, e.g., Mike Hayes & Kendall Taggart, Busted: The NYPD’s Secret 
Files, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 5, 2018, 2:58 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/kendalltaggart/secret-
nypd-files-hundreds-of-officers-committed-serious?utm_term=.qumQJgADK#.fjrOLAKaz 
[https://perma.cc/A5C3-82QK] (discussing NYPD officers who remain on the police force after 
committing serious misconduct, noting that “the people they arrest have little way to find out about 
the officer’s record. So they are forced to make life-changing decisions—such as whether to fight 
their charges in court or take a guilty plea—without knowing, for example, if the officer who arrested 
them is a convicted liar, information that a jury might find directly relevant”). 
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evidence—even if the officer has in fact engaged in misconduct—may not 
exist, or whatever records do exist may not accurately reflect what 
happened. In many jurisdictions, police departments are solely 
responsible for both creating records of potential misconduct by their own 
officers and reviewing misconduct allegations to determine whether they 
should be sustained.126 Given that individual officers and police 
departments as a whole have an incentive not to admit their own 
misconduct, these records routinely either are not made or, if made and 
reviewed, are resolved in favor of the officers, and thus do not accurately 
reflect what actually occurred.127 
Even when the records exist, many jurisdictions make accessing and 
using police records either difficult or impossible for defense attorneys in 
criminal cases.128 If defense counsel has no way of knowing whether the 
records exist, and cannot access or use them when they do exist, counsel 
cannot uncover information critical to the police officer’s credibility and 
cannot effectively overcome the jury’s presumption that the officer is a 
credible witness. 
A. Existence of Police Misconduct Records: An Informational 
Asymmetry 
The drastic contrast between the government’s ability to access and 
utilize a defendant’s history, and the defendant’s inability to do the same 
with police officer witnesses, arises in part from what may best be 
described as an informational asymmetry.129 I have written in the past 
about how our legal system is imbued with undue deference to police 
officers.130 This deference routinely rears its ugly head in the context of 
police misconduct records. For purposes of this Article, police misconduct 
records include, but are not limited to, reports authored by police officers; 
civilian complaints of misconduct by police officers; documented 
investigations into possible misconduct; and findings of misconduct by 
administrative, judicial, or prosecutorial bodies.131 
                                                     
126. See infra section II.A. 
127. Id. 
128. See infra section II.B. 
129. Thanks to Eve Primus for this helpful phraseology. 
130. See Moran, supra note 18.  
131. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 8, at 745 (defining police personnel records as files that contain, 
inter alia, “internal affairs reports, disciplinary write-ups, and performance evaluations, documenting 
a range of information that defendants can use to their advantage at trial”). 
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The government’s zeal in enacting regulations for collecting and 
storing data about defendants has not carried over to the reporting, 
recording, or storage of police misconduct data. No national databases 
catalog police officers who have engaged in misconduct.132 Nor can 
defense attorneys type an officer’s name into a registry and find out 
whether the officer has previously been disciplined for misconduct.133 The 
federal government has not promulgated uniform guidelines for 
recordkeeping pertaining to police misconduct,134 and in most states, 
decisions about what records to keep and how to collect and memorialize 
data are left to each individual police department.135 
Given the lack of external oversight, it should be no surprise that 
recordkeeping pertaining to police misconduct is sporadic and variable 
among jurisdictions. After a slew of tragic police shootings of people of 
color in recent years, reporters and scholars alike bemoaned the fact that 
it is impossible to say with certainty how many people police in the United 
States kill each year, because police departments are not required to report 
even that minimal amount of data.136 But the data problem extends far 
beyond officer-involved shooting deaths. As Professor Rachel Harmon 
has argued, the lack of consistent data and recordkeeping in police 
departments presents significant concerns on many levels, one of which 
is tracking police officers who commit misconduct.137 Many police 
                                                     
132. The National Decertification Index (NDI), funded by a United States Department of Justice 
grant, does serve as “a national registry of certificate or license revocation actions relating to officer 
misconduct.” See About NDI, INT’L ASS’N OF DIRS. OF LAW ENF’T STANDARDS & TRAINING, 
https://www.iadlest.org/Projects/NDI20.aspx [https://perma.cc/YS9L-XM4M]. The NDI, however, is 
limited to state government agencies that self-report decertification actions taken against police 
officers, and access to the NDI by non-law enforcement personnel will be granted only in “cases of 
legitimate need.” See Request NDI Access, INT’L ASS’N OF DIRS. OF LAW ENF’T STANDARDS & 
TRAINING, https://www.iadlest.org/Projects/NDI20/NonPOSTRequestAccess.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/QUJ5-Y837]. 
133. See Request NDI Access, supra note 132 (limiting its database to certification and 
deregistration actions rather than police misconduct more generally and requiring people other than 
law enforcement to identify a “legitimate need” for access to NDI).  
134. See Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 
1134–45 (2013) (discussing limited and largely ineffectual federal government efforts to obtain 
policing data). 
135. See id. at 1133 (noting that there is very little uniformity among states regarding what types 
of data police departments must collect). 
136. Wesley Lowery, How Many Police Shootings a Year? No One Knows, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/08/how-many-police-
shootings-a-year-no-one-knows/ [https://perma.cc/4BUU-X85U] (quoting a Department of Justice 
statistician stating that FBI shooting data has “significant limitations in terms of coverage and 
reliability”). 
137. See Harmon, supra note 134, at 1134–35. 
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departments do not keep records pertaining to basic issues such as how 
regularly police officers use force against civilians; how often an officer 
claims to be a victim of crimes by civilians (e.g., how frequently the 
officer arrests civilians for assault of the officer or resisting arrest); or how 
many times civilians have complained that an officer mistreated them and 
whether those complaints were sustained.138 
Even police departments that promulgate internal recordkeeping 
regulations often provide few incentives for police officers to comply with 
the regulations, or repercussions for those who do not. The Denver Police 
Department’s operations manual, for example, requires all officers to self-
report uses of force on civilians, and supervisors to investigate each use 
of force.139 But the manual specifies no consequences for an officer’s (or 
supervisor’s) failure to comply with the reporting requirement.140 When 
the Department of Justice investigated the Ferguson Police Department 
after Michael Brown’s death at the hands of Officer Darren Wilson, it 
summarized the police department’s policies for reviewing officers’ use 
of force as “particularly ineffectual.”141 The DOJ noted that supervisors 
assigned to review uses of force “do little to no investigation; either do 
not understand or choose not to follow FPD’s use-of-force policy in 
                                                     
138. See CIV. RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 38 (2015) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT], 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_ 
police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZV3-GD7S] (finding that Ferguson Police 
Department had ineffectual policies for tracking and reviewing officer use of force); CIV. RIGHTS 
DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE 11 (2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2014/12/04/ 
cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2U8-JYAX] (reporting that 
Cleveland police department had such poor recordkeeping that it could not determine whether civilian 
complaints had been investigated); CIV. RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT xvii-xviii, 79–80, 83–84, 88 (2011), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/74332/justice-department-report-on-
the-new-orleans.pdf [http://perma.cc/JNA4-HP87] (detailing similar problems in New Orleans Police 
Department). 
139. DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS MANUAL, § 105.01(1)(b) (Use of Force Policy); 
§ 105.02(1)(c)–(d) (Use of Force Procedures – Duty to Report), 
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/720/documents/OperationsManual/OM
SBook/OM_Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H5S-XPPJ]. 
140. Id. at § 105.02(1)(d)(5) (specifying that if a supervisor finds that violations may have 
occurred, he will immediately notify his commanding officer who will determine the appropriate 
course of action regarding additional investigation, i.e., notifying IAD, etc.); see also People v. 
Liechty, Case No. 16GS011155 (2016) (case documents on file with author) (after Denver police 
officer pushed civilian off bike and into metal railing, officer declined to report the use of force and 
supervisor failed to investigate; no investigation done into initial officer’s use of force and no 
discipline levied for failure to report). 
141. INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 138, at 38. 
12 - Moran.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:49 PM 
1364 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1339 
 
analyzing officer conduct; [and] rarely correct officer misconduct when 
they find it.”142 Police officers are also historically unwilling to report 
misconduct by fellow officers, so misconduct often goes unrecorded 
because officers do not tell on their own.143 
In other police departments, data regarding police misconduct is 
missing because the departments have actively refused to collect it. In the 
past several years, many police departments have been found to expressly 
discourage reporting of police misconduct, or refuse to record complaints 
when civilians attempt to file them.144 And, because the same police 
departments that receive reports of crime are often the sole agency 
responsible for investigating these crimes, they have ample opportunity to 
ensure that allegations of misconduct by police officers never come to 
light at all. In any of these situations, the police department may have no 
evidence of the reported misconduct because it was never recorded or 
investigated. 
Other branches of the criminal justice system do no better job of 
memorializing officer misconduct. In the context of police testimony, 
scholars and practitioners alike have long recognized that police officers 
                                                     
142. Id. 
143. E.g., N.Y. STATE. POLICE & CONN. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., REPORT ON THE EVALUATION 
OF THE CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY INTERNAL AFFAIRS PROGRAM ii, 132 (2006), 
(reporting on Connecticut state troopers’ attempts to cover up misconduct by other officers); 
Armacost, supra note 8, at 454 (“In the face of outside criticism, cops tend to circle the wagons, 
adopting a ‘code of silence,’ protecting each other, and defending each other’s actions.”); Bret D. 
Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms and Community Loyalty, 89 OR. L. REV. 1257, 1285–90 (2011) 
(discussing police officers’ unwillingness to report misconduct by their own); Gabriel J. Chin & Scott 
C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to 
Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 237 (1998) (“Police officers . . . lie under oath because of 
the ‘blue wall of silence,’ an unwritten code in many departments which prohibits . . . testifying 
truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow officer.”); Stan K. Shernock, The Effects 
of Patrol Officers’ Defensiveness Toward the Outside World on Their Ethical Orientations, CRIM. 
JUSTICE ETHICS 24, 25 (1990) (“[I]t is an unwritten law in police departments that police officers 
must never testify against their brother officers.”). 
144. See, e.g., ACLU OF CONN., PROTECT, SERVE AND LISTEN: ACCEPTING CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS 
AT CONNECTICUT POLICE DEPARTMENTS 1 (2012), 
https://www.acluct.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/protectservelisten.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B89R-B6UH] (detailing deficiencies in Connecticut police departments’ practices 
for accepting civilian complaints); ACLU OF N.J., THE CRISIS INSIDE POLICE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 5, 
9–12 (2009), https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/3013/1540/4573/060409IA2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XG4X-E69W] (discussing common ways police departments inhibit citizens from 
filing complaints against police officers); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the 
Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 760, 775–76 (2004) (discussing 
secrecy provisions in civil settlements against police officers and departments); Rachel Moran, 
Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 854–56 (2016) (collecting accounts of police 
departments that attempted to prevent civilians from filing complaints); Harmon, supra note 134, at 
1130 (police departments often “discourag[e] citizens from filing complaints about officer conduct”). 
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lie—frequently—when testifying.145 Despite this widespread 
understanding, judges are extremely reluctant to call out officers for their 
lies or to suppress evidence based on officer incredibility.146 In the rare 
instance a judge does find that an officer lied, that information is seldom 
recorded or stored in any searchable database. In most jurisdictions, 
neither the prosecutor’s office nor the police department is required to 
keep records of police officers who are found to have testified falsely, and 
prosecutors have an obvious incentive not to record the information as 
they rely on these officers regularly to prove their cases, and would be 
required to inform defense counsel if they knew their officer witness had 
a history of false testimony.147 Given these practices, a police officer may 
have a pattern of testifying falsely, yet no record of it will exist. 
Even where records do exist, they may not accurately reflect 
misconduct that occurred. Police departments that rely on self-reporting 
of incidents such as use of force can expect that officers will underreport 
their own possible misconduct.148 Police departments also often fail to 
properly investigate reports from outside parties. In most police 
departments, complaints of police misconduct are reviewed by internal 
affairs units with the same police department.149 Accordingly, when a 
                                                     
145. See supra note 9. 
146. See Russell D. Covey, Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1375, 1413 (2014) (positing that judges are often reluctant to doubt police testimony); Laurie L. 
Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 787, 790–91 (2001). 
147. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring government to disclose evidence 
within its possession that is exculpatory and material to the case); Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute 
the Police, supra note 17, at 1471 (discussing prosecutors’ incentives to avoid inquiring into or 
recording instances of police perjury); Jaxon Van Derbeken, Police with Problems Are a Problem for 
D.A., S.F. CHRON (May 16, 2010), http:// www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Police-with-problems-are-
a-problem-for-D-A-3264681.php [https://perma.cc/ASS9-R7E9] (reporting prosecutor who said that 
colleagues “were not eager to dig into officers’ backgrounds” because of credibility issues that could 
arise); Mark Fazlollah et al., Philadelphia’s DA Office Keeps Secret List of Suspect Police, THE 
INQUIRER (Feb. 13, 2018), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/philadelphia-police-misconduct-list-
larry-krasner-seth-williams-meek-mill-20180213.html [https://perma.cc/S8PT-W823] (describing 
Philadelphia DA’s practice of compiling a list of police officers known to have credibility problems 
due to misconduct, but refusing to provide that list to defense attorneys in criminal cases). 
148. COLLEEN LEWIS, COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE: THE POLITICS OF REFORM 9 (1999); 
Stephen Clarke, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of How Civilian 
Oversight of the Police Should Function and How It Fails, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 5 (2009).  
149. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS ABOUT 
POLICE USE OF FORCE 4–5 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ccpuf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8R7X-3TLF]; see also Internal Affairs Unit, Shielded From Justice: Police 
Brutality and Accountability in the United States, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1998), 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo25.htm [https://perma.cc/8XPS-JD62] (“Internal 
affairs divisions are at the center of any examination of how police departments deal with human 
rights abuses committed by officers.”). For readers unfamiliar with the internal affairs review process 
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civilian complains about misconduct by an officer within a police 
department, other officers in that same department both receive and 
investigate the complaint. 
In previous work, I have explained that internal affairs review is often 
biased—implicitly or, not uncommonly, overtly—in favor of the officers, 
and conducted with the intent to justify the officers’ behavior.150 Internal 
affairs review has historically produced extremely low rates of sustained 
complaints.151 Internal affairs records may exonerate an officer, or decline 
to sustain a complaint, even when the officer did engage in misconduct.152 
Other internal affairs departments routinely fail to review the complaint 
at all, thus leaving no paper trail other than perhaps the complaint itself, 
and no resolution as to whether the officer engaged in misconduct.153 
                                                     
and how it traditionally operates, I recommend two works: U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS AND 
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE, 
http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p164-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TYE-GQ2L] (providing 
guidelines for what should happen when a civilian files a complaint with an internal affairs unit) and 
Ryan J. Reilly, Here’s What Happens When You Complain to Cops About Cops, HUFFPOST (Oct. 13, 
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/internal-affairs-police-
misconduct_us_5613ea2fe4b022a4ce5f87ce [https://perma.cc/67R5-X25N] (discussing what 
happens when a citizen tries to file a complaint with an internal affairs unit). 
150. Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, supra note 144; see also Garcia v. City of Newark, 
No. 08-1725 (SRC), 2011 WL 689616, at *34 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2011) (concluding that Newark Police 
Department’s internal affairs unit had a pattern of “almost invariably reject[ing]” civilian complaints); 
OFFICE OF THE INDEP. POLICE AUDITOR, CITY OF SAN JOSE, 2014 IPA YEAR END REPORT 9, 63 
(2014), http://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/42029 [https://perma.cc/2FVY-5KJ2] (as 
of 2014, the San Jose Police Department had never sustained a complaint of racial bias by an officer); 
Walter Katz, Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent Investigations of Police Lethal 
Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 235, 238 (2015) (noting that the system of internal review has been 
“criticized for years for its inherent bias”); Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring 
Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 503 (2008); INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE, supra 
note 138, at 5, 35 (internal affairs investigators admitting that they reviewed complaints with the goal 
of exonerating the accused officers); N.Y. STATE POLICE, supra note 143, at ii, 133.  
151. Moran, In Police We Trust, supra note 18, at 979–80 (citing numerous agencies with 
extremely low percentages of sustained complaints). 
152. E.g., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 138, at vii, 18 
(finding that New Orleans PD supervisors routinely approved uses of force even when it was clearly 
unjustified); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 4, 12, 19 
(2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findletter_12-16-
11.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA39-9W36] (concluding that Seattle PD’s review process was designed to 
rubber-stamp officers’ use of force). 
153. E.g., Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208, 217 (D.N.J. 2015); INVESTIGATION OF 
THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 138, at 2, 83 (noting that the Ferguson Police 
Department frequently failed to review complaints); INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION 
OF POLICE, supra note 138, at 11 (reporting “serious concerns” regarding the Cleveland Police 
Department’s internal affairs review process, particularly pertaining to “use of force and 
accountability-related documents”); OIR GROUP, REPORT ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS OPERATIONS IN THE DENVER SHERIFF DEPARTMENT 47 (2015), 
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Independent review agencies—entities other than police departments 
created, in part, to review complaints alleging police misconduct154—are 
not a panacea to the ills of inaccurate records. Although the agencies are 
ostensibly intended to alleviate the bias in internal affairs units, many are 
staffed by former police officers, or otherwise have close ties to the 
officers and departments they are supposed to hold accountable.155 These 
agencies also tend to sustain an inordinately low percentage of complaints 
of officer misconduct.156 
Lastly, even if the records existed at one time, they may not exist by 
the time a defendant seeks to use them. A recent review of sixty police 
department contracts revealed that more than one-third contained 
provisions allowing or even requiring police departments and review 
agencies to destroy civilian complaint records after a period of years.157 
Some states also allow government agencies to destroy police disciplinary 
records after a period of three or five years.158 In contrast to records of 
defendants’ convictions, which are typically preserved for the defendant’s 
entire life and beyond, police officers found to have committed 
                                                     
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/d85a96_d9c8a5c357224183bfa30fc58d9bddab.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HX48-MF3A] (Denver Sheriff’s Department Internal Affairs Unit failed to 
investigate multiple complaints); see also Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, supra note 144, 
at 856–58. 
154. SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT (2001); 
Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review Boards, 28 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 593 (1997); SAMUEL WALKER, Alternative Models of Citizen 
Oversight, in CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 11 (2006). 
155. See CHI. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: 
RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 79 (2016), 
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5J43-T8KV] (noting the “persistent failure” of Chicago’s independent review 
authority to hold police officers accountable for misconduct); Radley Balko, The South Carolina 
Police Files: Gunslinging Raids, Coverups and Magical Dog Sniffs, WASH. POST (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2016/05/31/the-south-carolina-police-files-
gunslinging-raids-coverups-and-magical-dog-sniffs/ [https://perma.cc/SQP9-KC5W]; Chip Mitchell, 
City Sends Police-Shooting Investigators to Trainer Accused of Pro-Cop Bias, WBEZ NEWS (Sep. 
28, 2015), http://www.wbez.org/news/city-sends-police-shooting-investigators-trainer-accused-pro-
cop-bias-113077 [https://perma.cc/9T2V-VEYZ]; Moran, In Police We Trust, supra note 18 at 973–
74.  
156. See Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, supra note 144, at 868–79 (discussing 
numerous flaws in design of independent review agencies and their low percentage of sustained 
complaints). 
157. Adeshina Emmanuel, How Union Contracts Shield Police Departments from DOJ Reforms, 
IN THESE TIMES (June 21, 2016), http://inthesetimes.com/features/police-killings-union-
contracts.html [https://perma.cc/76U5-GNEE]. 
158. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.5(b) (2017); Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 23 A.3d 205, 
212 (Md. 2011). 
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misconduct may have all records of that misconduct destroyed just a few 
years later. 
B. Access to Police Misconduct Records: Doctrinal and Political 
Reluctance 
While non-existence of police misconduct records is one major 
hindrance to defense counsel’s efforts to contest the credibility of a police 
officer witness, inability to access existing records is another. Before 
turning specifically to the difficulties defendants face when attempting to 
obtain police personnel records in criminal cases, a brief discussion of the 
general process for obtaining documentary evidence in criminal cases is 
important for comparison purposes. Criminal discovery is significantly 
more limited than civil discovery, and is often confined to statements of 
witnesses or the defendant, or police reports summarizing the 
government’s investigation into the charged case.159 However, both 
parties have subpoena power.160 If a defendant wants to obtain 
documentary evidence pertaining to a lay witness in a case, the defendant 
may move for a subpoena duces tecum requiring the witness (or party in 
possession of the documents) to produce the requested items. The court 
will quash or modify the subpoena only if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive to the non-moving party.161 
In contrast to the general process for subpoenaing records pertaining to 
lay witnesses in criminal cases, the vast majority of jurisdictions162 have 
laws that protect the confidentiality of police personnel records, and many 
of these states either prohibit or make it extremely difficult for defense 
counsel to access these confidential records.163 These laws are expressions 
                                                     
159. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26, with FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. See also, e.g., Dig. Equip. Corp. v. 
Currie Enters., 142 F.R.D. 8, 13 (D. Mass. 1991) (summarizing the differences between civil and 
criminal discovery); David A. Hyman, When Rules Collide: Procedural Intersection and the Rule of 
Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1389, 1397 (1997) (“Criminal cases provide for very restricted discovery, while 
civil cases allow quite expansive discovery.”). 
160. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 17.  
161. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). 
162. While the exact number of states that permit public access to police records is open to dispute 
(in part because even states with ostensible public-access regimes still withhold some records), it is 
definitely a significant minority. Compare Abel, supra note 8, at 770, n.143 (asserting that only eight 
states—Florida, Texas, Minnesota, Arizona, Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, and South Carolina—
make police personnel records available to the public), with PROJECT WNYC, Disciplinary Records, 
https://project.wnyc.org/disciplinary-records/ [https://perma.cc/4TNG-H3AC] (concluding that 
twelve states make police records generally available to the public, but still withhold some records as 
confidential). 
163. See, e.g., AURORA, COLO. MUN. CODE § 50-41 (2017) (placing strict limitations on disclosure 
of police records even when deemed relevant to criminal proceedings); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-
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of both doctrinal and political reluctance. As a doctrinal matter, 
lawmakers frequently justify their unwillingness to allow defense counsel 
access to police records by theorizing that such access would violate 
officers’ rights to privacy, and would chill officers’ speech and conduct.164 
As a political matter, police departments tend to have strong unions, 
reigning in police is far less popular than being “tough” on criminals, and 
few lawmakers are willing to stand up to police department demands that 
their personnel records—including misconduct records—remain 
confidential.165 However the objection is framed, the result is that the 
defendant has little or no ability to access information about the person on 
whose testimony a conviction or acquittal may rest. Although police 
personnel records “constitute a potential gold mine of information 
valuable to one accused of a crime against a peace officer,” they are 
nonetheless, in many situations, off-limits to the accused.166 
The strictest jurisdictions protect police personnel records from 
disclosure in virtually every circumstance. Vermont, for example, has a 
state statute providing that police internal affairs records “shall be 
confidential,” with only four exceptions, none of which pertain to criminal 
                                                     
a (McKinney 2016) (preventing disclosure of police records except by court order); Copley Press, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d 288, 296, 311 (Cal. 2006) (holding that police personnel records are 
confidential under state law); David Packman, Police Misconduct Disclosure Laws, CATO INST. (Feb. 
7, 2010), http://www.policemisconduct.net/police-misconduct-disclosure-laws/ 
[https://perma.cc/G7UX-TCXA] (summarizing police misconduct disclosure laws in all fifty states); 
Abel, supra note 8, at 745–46 (discussing how various state and city laws hamper disclosure of police 
personnel records in criminal cases). 
164. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (2017); People v. Zamora, 615 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Cal. 1980) 
(expressing concern that, if officers’ records are available in criminal trials, the officers may make 
fewer arrests because the arrestees will not be prosecuted anyway); People v. Norman, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 
52 (N.Y. 1973); David A. Plymyer, Shining a Light on Police Misconduct, BALT. SUN (Jan. 19, 2016), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-police-transparency-20160119-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/29S8-HKP8] (noting that the Fraternal Order of Police in Baltimore objected to 
disclosure of police records because it would “embarrass[ ]” the police officers). 
165. See Abel, supra note 8, at 746–47 (discussing police unions’ ability to pressure prosecutors 
not to disclose Brady evidence); Clarke, supra note 148, at 5 (“Crime control is often a higher political 
priority than preventing police misconduct.”); David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. 1149, 1151 (2014) (“[T]he politics of crime tends to deter politicians from taking an active role 
in limiting police power.”); Levine, Police Suspects, supra note 17, at 1205–06 (noting that police 
officers are able to negotiate or lobby for preferential treatment in the justice system); Levine, Who 
Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, supra note 17, at 1475–76 (discussing intense political pressure from 
police unions not to prosecute police suspects); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2468 (1996) (observing 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has in recent decades “clearly become less sympathetic to claims of 
individual rights and more accommodating to assertions of the need for public order”).  
166. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Accused’s Right to Discovery or Inspection of Records of Prior 
Complaints Against, or Similar Personnel Records of, Peace Officer Involved in the Case, 86 
A.L.R.3D 1170, § 2[a] (2017 supp.). 
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defendants.167 The Supreme Court of Vermont has interpreted this statute 
as prohibiting defendants in criminal cases from obtaining police officers’ 
internal affairs records.168 In State v. Roy, 169 the defendant was charged 
with assault of a police officer and attempting to elude a police officer, 
and sought the personnel file of the officer he allegedly attacked, to show 
that the officer had a history of using excessive force while making 
arrests.170 The Vermont Supreme Court held that, because internal affairs 
records are confidential under state statute, they could neither be disclosed 
to defense counsel nor used at trial.171 
Most states do not impose absolute bars on access to such evidence, but 
instead make it extremely difficult for defense counsel to obtain the 
evidence. The New York law governing disclosure of police records is a 
prime example.172 The law covers a broad swath of law enforcement 
records, providing that “[a]ll personnel records used to evaluate 
performance toward continued employment or promotion” shall be 
“considered confidential and not subject to inspection or review” without 
express consent, in writing, from the police officer whose records are at 
issue.173 The only exception to this mandatory confidentiality provision is 
a “lawful court order.”174 A court may lawfully order disclosure of the 
records, however, only after a hearing in which the defendant makes a 
“clear showing of facts sufficient to warrant the judge to request records 
for review.”175 If the judge finds that the defendant has satisfied the “clear 
showing” standard, the judge may order disclosure of the records only in 
sealed form, and only to the court, not to defense counsel.176 If the judge 
reviews the personnel records and determines that they are both “relevant 
and material” to the case, then and only then may the judge disclose those 
                                                     
167. 20 V.S. § 1923(d) (2018). Vermont also recently enacted a separate statute granting public 
access to anonymized records of complaints against police officers (though not records of the internal 
investigations), as well as records of formal charges against officers that resulted in discipline. See 20 
V.S. § 2409 (2018). 
168. State v. Roy, 557 A.2d 884, 893 (Vt. 1989), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brillon, 
955 A.2d 1108 (Vt. 2008). 
169. 557 A.2d 884 (Vt. 1989). 
170. Id. at 886, 892–95. 
171. Id. at 893–95 (noting, however, that the defendant failed to raise the issue until the day of trial, 
and that the court did “not exclude the possibility that a defendant could have access to internal 
investigation files in a proper case and in a proper manner”). 
172. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2016). 
173. Id. at (1). 
174. Id.  
175. Id. at (2). 
176. Id. at (3). 
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records to defense counsel.177 Notably, the confidentiality law does not 
apply at all to prosecutors within the state; they may access the records 
upon only a showing that the request is “in the furtherance of their official 
functions.”178 
It is no secret that the law is aimed to prevent defense attorneys from 
accessing police records. New York courts have expressly admitted just 
that, repeatedly stating that the purpose of the law is to prohibit “fishing 
expeditions” by lawyers looking for “collateral materials to be used for 
impeachment purposes.”179 But scouring collateral records for 
impeachment evidence is what prosecutors do all the time against 
defendants, and the law does not prevent prosecutors from doing so.180 
As for the “clear showing” burden, New York courts have interpreted 
this as requiring that defendants have a “good faith . . . factual 
predicate”181 to show that the police personnel record in question actually 
contains “information, which, if known to the trier of fact, could very well 
affect the outcome of the trial.”182 This is circular reasoning, of course. 
The defendant can hardly be expected to show that the records exist to 
obtain permission to review the records, if the defendant cannot access the 
records without first making a clear showing that they exist. Nonetheless, 
it is a common justification of courts when denying such motions.183 
California similarly puts “strict limits” on disclosure of police 
misconduct records to defendants in criminal proceedings.184 By state 
statute—enacted specifically to protect peace officer personnel records 
                                                     
177. Id. 
178. Id. at (4). 
179. See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Waverly Police Dep’t, 279 A.D.2d 833, 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) 
(“[The statute] is designed to eliminate fishing expeditions into police officers’ personnel files for 
collateral materials to be used for impeachment purposes . . . .”); Zarn v. City of New York, 198 
A.D.2d 220, 220–21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (same); Capital Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v. 
Burns, 109 A.D.2d 92, 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff’d, 496 N.E.2d 665 (1986) (affirming that N.Y. 
Civ. Rights Law § 50-a was designed to prevent defense attorneys from “fishing expeditions” into 
police officers’ personnel files). 
180. See supra Part I. 
181. People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E. 2d 924, 928 (N.Y. 1979) (citing N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 
§ 50-a for proposition that defense counsel must have a good-faith reason to believe that disciplinary 
records exist before the court will grant a request to review the file). 
182. Id. at 927. 
183. See, e.g., id. at 928 (noting that courts can deny defendants access to police records if 
defendants cannot articulate the relevance and materiality of the records). 
184. See Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d 288, 296 (Cal. 2006); Swetha Kannan et 
al., You’ve Been Arrested by a Dishonest Cop. Can You Win in a System Set Up to Protect Officers?, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-brady-list-secrecy/ 
[https://perma.cc/TY84-54MU]. 
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from discovery in civil or criminal proceedings—police personnel records 
in California are confidential, and can be disclosed in criminal 
proceedings only if the defendant satisfies numerous specified 
conditions.185 If the defendant seeks such records, the defendant must first 
file a written motion served upon both the court and the party in 
possession of the records, describing the “type of records or information 
sought.”186 Much like New York, California requires a defendant to show 
“good cause” for disclosure of the requested records, including an 
affidavit explaining the defendant’s “reasonable belief that the 
governmental agency identified has the records or information from the 
records.”187 Here too, the defendant must show that the records exist 
before the defendant can examine the records to see what exists. One 
California Supreme Court case has recognized that this rule puts 
defendants in the untenable position of “having to allege with particularity 
the very information he is seeking.”188 
Many states put the onus on defendants to assert specific facts showing 
both that the requested police records exist and that they would involve 
information material to the defense. In Colorado, defendants must first 
“set[ ] forth a specific factual basis” to show that the requested records 
both exist and contain evidence material to the case before a court will 
grant a motion for subpoena duces tecum of the records.189 Other state 
courts have denied defendants’ requests for personnel records of law 
enforcement officers, on the basis that the defendants could not first make 
a specific showing that the confidential records contained information 
pertinent to the theory of defense.190 
                                                     
185. CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7(a) (2017); SEN. COM. ON JUDICIARY, CITIZENS’ COMPLAINTS & 
PEACE OFFICER PERSONNEL RECORDS 1 (Apr. 3, 1978). 
186. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043(a)–(b) (West 2018). These motions are referred to as “Pitchess” 
motions because of the case that originally set out standards (now codified in CAL. EVID. CODE 
§ 1043) for defendants seeking to obtain police records in criminal cases. See Pitchess v. Superior 
Court, 522 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1974); Corina Knoll et al., An L.A. County Deputy Faked Evidence. Here’s 
How His Misconduct was Kept Secret in Court for Years, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-brady-list-secrecy-court-20180809-htmlstory.html# 
[https://perma.cc/RS6G-H8X3]. 
187. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043(b)(3). 
188. People v. Memro, 700 P.2d 446, 464 (Cal. 1985); see also Fletcher v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 99, 104 n.3 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (labeling the statutory scheme for requesting disclosure 
of police records as “a set of circumstances in which one requirement . . . is dependent upon another, 
which is in turn dependent upon the first”). 
189. People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662, 666, 669 (Colo. 2010); see also Martinelli v. Dist. Court, 612 
P.2d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); People v. Blackmon, 20 P.3d 1215, 1220 (Colo. App. 2000). 
190. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-24 (2014); id. at § 160A-168 (exempting personnel records from 
public access); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(2) (2013) (exempting personnel records from disclosure 
to the public if such disclosure would constitute an “invasion of personal privacy”); State v. Jones, 
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Although some might assume that defendants can overcome the hurdle 
of figuring out whether the records exist (and what they would say) by 
first deposing the police officer who is the subject of the prospective 
records, that solution is far more feasible for civil litigants than criminal 
defendants. Approximately 80% of states provide no right to depositions 
in criminal cases.191 Accordingly, unless defense counsel has other 
avenues for obtaining information about the police officer witness, 
counsel’s only hope is attempting an interview, which the officer can—
and typically does—refuse. 
Still other jurisdictions have statutes or ordinances that allow defense 
counsel to move for subpoena of police personnel records, but only if the 
defendant is charged with a specific, limited category of offenses.192 One 
such model is the Aurora, Colorado municipal code, which provides that 
if (and only if) the charges against the defendant involve an allegation of 
“actual application of physical force” by the defendant upon a police 
officer, or by the police officer upon a defendant, then the defendant may 
move for subpoena duces tecum of a small class of police personnel 
records.193 In order to obtain the subpoena, the defendant must “make an 
initial showing to the court why the production of such files is reasonable 
                                                     
59 A.3d 320 (Conn. App. 2013) (denying defendant’s request for officer’s personnel records because 
defendant did not offer information to suggest that the personnel file contained evidence pertaining 
to officer’s credibility in prosecution for assault of a police officer); In re Brooks, 548 S.E.2d 748, 
755 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (denying request for police officer internal affairs records because the 
request was insufficiently specific and not supported by affidavit); State v. Cano, 743 P.2d 956 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1987) (denying defendant’s request for personnel records of law enforcement officer who 
he was charged with assaulting, where defendant did not make showing that officer had history of 
dishonesty); Jinks v. State, 274 S.E.2d 46 (Ga. App. 1980) (properly denying defendant access to 
officer’s personnel file, where defendant failed to show anything in the file was exculpatory, in 
prosecution for battery of police officer); see also Ghent, supra note 166, at § 3[a] (summarizing 
similar cases). 
191. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Accused’s Right to Depose Prospective Witnesses Before Trial in State 
Court, 2 A.L.R. 4TH 704, § 2 (“Traditionally, a person accused of crime has been held not entitled to 
take the pretrial depositions of prospective witnesses.”); see N.H. REV. STAT. § 517:13 (2017) 
(permitting depositions in criminal cases only at the discretion of the judge and where the party 
seeking the deposition proves it necessary by a preponderance of the evidence); FED. R. CRIM. P. 
15(a) (governing the deposition of witnesses in criminal cases, and providing that courts may grant 
motions for depositions in “exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice”); WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1235 (8th ed. 
1994) (reporting that only ten states permit depositions in criminal cases). 
192. See Ghent, supra note 166, at § 2[a] (collecting cases for the proposition that jurisdictions are 
most likely to permit disclosure of police personnel records when the defendant is charged with 
violence against an officer, and that disclosure of the records is often “totally denied” in cases that do 
not involve an allegation of violence against an officer). 
193. AURORA, COLO. MUNI. CODE. § 50-41(a)(1) (2017).  
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and necessary in the preparation of his or her defense.”194 If the defendant 
can satisfy the initial burden of showing why the records are reasonable 
and necessary to the preparation of his or her defense, then the police 
department will be ordered to produce only those records “involving 
allegations of excessive use of force, brutality, or misrepresentation or 
untruthfulness on the part of the officer involved.”195 Those records shall 
then be produced, under seal, to the court for in camera review; the court 
need only release to defense counsel the records that it deems relevant and 
material to the defense.196 In determining whether the records should be 
released, the court may weigh a wide variety of factors, including not only 
the necessity of the information to the defendant’s case, but also, inter 
alia, the impact that disclosure may have on the police officer, and the 
degree to which various government interests may be thwarted by release 
of the records.197 The defendant must bear the costs associated with 
producing any of the released materials.198 
To the surprise of many scholars and practitioners, the fact that the 
police records may contain exculpatory evidence does not render the 
records necessarily disclosable under all state laws. More than fifty years 
ago, in Brady v. Maryland,199 the U.S. Supreme Court famously held that 
the prosecution must disclose to defendants in criminal cases all material 
exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution.200 However, for 
prosecutors to disclose evidence, they must first know of it.201 Although 
U.S. Supreme Court case law has interpreted Brady as requiring 
prosecutors to disclose evidence within the possession of the police, on 
the theory that the police are an arm of the prosecutor’s office,202 some 
                                                     
194. Id. at (a)(2). 
195. Id. at (a)(3). 
196. Id. at (b)–(c).  
197. Id. at (b). 
198. Id. at (f). 
199. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
200. Id.; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding that the prosecutor’s failure 
to disclose material evidence affecting the credibility of a witness may violate due process); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (stating that prosecutors shall “make 
timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense”). 
201. See Abel, supra note 8; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
202. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); see also Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 
867, 869–70 (2006) (per curiam); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 693 (2004); People v. Gutierrez, 
6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 138, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
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states have exempted police personnel records from Brady’s reach by 
refusing to allow prosecutors access to the police records.203 
Jonathan Abel has labeled misconduct evidence in police personnel 
files “a critical source of Brady material that even well-meaning 
prosecutors are often unable to discover or disclose.”204 A California court 
recently interpreted California’s police records statute as preventing the 
Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department from voluntarily disclosing evidence 
to the prosecutor’s office of 300 officers found guilty of significant 
misconduct, including offenses such as making false statements, 
tampering with evidence, and using excessive force.205 When the Sheriff 
attempted to provide this evidence to the prosecutor’s office, the Los 
Angeles Deputy Sheriff’s union sued.206 The California Court of Appeals 
sided with the union, finding that, under California’s confidentiality 
provisions, the Sheriff could not provide this information even to the 
prosecutor’s office.207 The California Supreme Court has agreed to review 
the question of whether law enforcement agencies may reveal the names 
of officers on an “internal Brady list” to prosecuting agencies.208 
In other jurisdictions, prosecutors have statutory access to police 
personnel records, but purposely do not seek them out, so as to remain 
ignorant of any exculpatory information those records might contain.209 
And courts permit this: In New York, for example, the Court of Appeals 
                                                     
203. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (West 2017); 20 V.S.A. § 1923(d) (2017). 
204. Abel, supra note 8, at 745. 
205. Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court of Cal. et al., 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2017), petition for review granted, 403 P.3d 144 (Cal. Oct. 11, 2017); see also Jessica Pishko, 
Why Are the Courts Protecting Bad Cops?, SLATE (Mar. 15, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/trials_and_error/2017/03/the_l_a_county_sheriff_
wants_to_reveal_300_problem_cops_the_courts_won_t.html [https://perma.cc/6VWM-RTC5]. 
206. Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 57. 
207. Id.; see also People v. Superior Court of S. F., 377 P.3d 847 (Cal. 2015) (prosecutors comply 
with Brady obligations by informing defense counsel of personnel records they know about; if 
personnel records are unknown, prosecutors have no obligation to disclose). But see, e.g., ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 30-A, § 503 (2014) (allowing prosecutors to disclose confidential personnel records in 
criminal cases, if necessary to comply with Brady). 
208. Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court of California et al., 403 P.3d 144 (Cal. Oct. 
11, 2017). 
209. See Abel, supra note 8, at 775–78 (and citations therein) (discussing jurisdictions where 
prosecutors make no attempt to discover evidence of police misconduct within personnel records). 
But see, e.g., WASH. ASS’N OF SHERIFFS & POLICE CHIEFS, MODEL POLICY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES REGARDING BRADY EVIDENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT WITNESSES WHO ARE 
EMPLOYEES/OFFICERS 3 (2009) (calling on prosecutors to review police personnel files and disclose 
Brady evidence); WASH. ASS’N OF PROSECUTING ATT’YS, MODEL POLICY, DISCLOSURE OF 
POTENTIAL IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE FOR RECURRING INVESTIGATIVE OR PROFESSIONAL 
WITNESSES 3–5 (2013) (same). 
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has held that, while prosecutors should not be explicitly discouraged from 
investigating potential police misconduct, they are not required to ask 
officer witnesses about a history of misconduct in order to fulfill their 
Brady obligations.210 
Still other states leave room to sidestep Brady by holding that the right 
to exculpatory evidence must be balanced against the right to 
confidentiality in privileged information. Colorado has gone so far as to 
conclude—though in a distinct setting, involving evidence that was not in 
the government’s possession—that a defendant’s right to exculpatory 
evidence must be balanced against “the competing interests of a witness 
to protect personal information and of the government to prevent 
unnecessary trial delays and unwarranted harassment of witnesses.”211 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, taking another tactic, has 
simply declined to find that evidence of prior police misconduct is 
exculpatory, and instead held that it cannot be used for impeachment 
purposes at trial.212 The U.S. Supreme Court has never decided a Brady 
case involving disclosure of police personnel records, and thus has never 
provided desperately-needed guidance to lower courts or practitioners on 
how to apply Brady in the context of these records. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that even if records exist and the court orders 
disclosure, those in possession may still not disclose them. The records 
that defense counsel are seeking are, in most situations, held exclusively 
by the police department, and sometimes also the prosecutor’s office. 
These entities have the greatest incentive not to disclose the records if the 
records are damaging to the cases they are charging and prosecuting. They 
may also be able to withhold the evidence with little fear of being 
discovered, because no one else has access to it—if defense counsel seeks 
police records and the police department responds that the records do not 
exist, the inquiry generally stops there. Though I do not suggest this 
                                                     
210. People v. Garrett, 18 N.E.3d 722, 732 (N.Y. 2014); see also COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASSOC., FORMAL OPINION 09-454, PROSECUTOR’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENSE 4 (2009) (concluding that Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct 3.8 “does not establish a duty to undertake an investigation in search of 
exculpatory evidence”). But see, e.g., State v. Theodosopoulos, 893 A.2d 712, 714 (N.H. 2006) 
(requiring prosecutor to review police personnel files). 
211. People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662, 670–71 (Colo. 2010) (holding that a defendant’s right to 
exculpatory evidence is “not absolute”); see also Martinelli v. Dist. Court, 612 P.2d 1083, 1091 (Colo. 
1980) (en banc) (addressing requests for disclosure of police records in the civil context, and holding 
that trial courts can refuse to disclose privileged records). 
212. See United States v. Akers, 374 A.2d 874 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that trial court abused 
its discretion by ordering release of records showing that police officers had previously used excessive 
force on other civilians where defendants were charged with assaulting those officers, because such 
evidence was not admissible to impeach the officers). 
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happens in the majority of cases, the problem of prosecutors withholding 
Brady evidence is common enough to infer that withholding of police 
personnel records likely occurs as well.213 
C. Use of Police Misconduct Records: Judicial Reluctance 
The Federal Rules of Evidence, and state bodies of law patterned on 
the Federal Rules, do not explicitly address use or admission of police 
misconduct records at trial. In some jurisdictions, courts never reach—
and defense attorneys rarely litigate—the issue of whether the records can 
be admitted at trial, because the records are either deemed completely 
confidential and thus not available for access by defense counsel,214 or are 
available only in prosecutions for certain charges.215 If defense counsel 
cannot access the records, counsel obviously cannot use them at trial. 
In jurisdictions that do not definitively bar police records from being 
disclosed in criminal trials, the question of whether the records are 
admissible at trial is closely—at times inseparably—linked to the issue of 
access. Many of the statutes discussed in Section B of this Part vest trial 
courts with discretion to release police records, but place on defendants 
the burden of showing with specificity that the records both exist and are 
relevant, material, and necessary to defense of the charged case.216 Thus, 
the determination of whether the records are relevant, and presumptively 
admissible at trial,217 is expressly wrapped up in the process judges engage 
in when deciding whether to release the records at all. 
                                                     
213. E.g., United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 (D. Mass. 2009); Notice of Filing of 
Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, In re Special Proceedings, No. 09-0198 (EGS), (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 
2012), 2012 WL 858523; David Jaros, Criminal Doctrines of Faith (Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of Law 
Legal Stud. Research Paper, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126451 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (positing that the Supreme Court has been overly dismissive of concerns 
regarding prosecutorial misconduct and withholding exculpatory evidence); Neil A. Lewis, Tables 
Turned on Prosecution in Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/politics/08stevens.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2018); 
Editorial, Rampant Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sunday/rampant-prosecutorial-misconduct.html (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
214. See supra notes 161–164. 
215. See supra notes 165–190. 
216. AURORA, COLO. MUNI. CODE. § 50-41(a)(2) (2017); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043((b)(3) (West 
2018); People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E. 2d 924, 927–29 (N.Y. 1979); In re Brooks, 548 S.E.2d 748, 
755 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Blackmon, 20 P.3d 1215, 1220 (Colo. App. 2000). 
217. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (“Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides 
otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by 
the Supreme Court.”). 
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In practice, when told that defendants have the burden of establishing 
that the requested records are not only relevant but material and necessary 
to the defense, judges often default to simply not releasing the records at 
all.218 This is in part the result of political pressures: police departments 
routinely object to records requests, even when the request is merely for 
in camera review by judges.219 Being known as the judge who overrules 
the police and requires them to disclose records is hardly a popular 
position, and state court judges in particular are vulnerable to political 
pressure.220 As a practical matter, judges also have busy dockets. Lengthy 
hearings about whether to release information, with attorneys for the 
police officer, police department, and prosecutor’s office all objecting, cut 
into precious court time. When the initial burden is on the defendant to 
show that the records exist and are relevant to his case, it may be easier to 
simply conclude that the defendant did not meet his burden, than to require 
the police department to produce the records, find time for the judge to 
review the records, and then engage in a lengthy battle about whether the 
records should be released and admitted into evidence at trial. 
Beyond political pressures and time constraints, judges also have a 
tendency to trust and defer to the police, as I have noted in earlier work.221 
Many judges are former prosecutors, who have had long working 
relationships with police officers.222 Most are also white men, a 
                                                     
218. Milstead v. Johnson, 883 N.W.2d 725 (S.D. 2016) (declining to require production of police 
officer-complainant’s personnel records on grounds that defendant’s request was not sufficiently 
specific in prosecution for assault of a police officer); see also City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court 
of L.A. Cty. 52 P.3d 129, 141–43 (Cal. 2002) (Moreno, J., dissenting) (citing City of Santa Cruz v. 
Mun. Court, 776 P.2d 222, 227 (Cal. 1989) (en banc)) (complaining that trial courts far too often 
decide requests for police records by prohibiting the defendant access); Robinson v. State, 730 A.2d 
181, 185 (Md. 1999) (reviewing internal affairs records of officers and determining “that there is no 
exculpatory information in either of those two [records]” in murder case where police officers were 
key witnesses against defendant). 
219. Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Defending the Public: Police Accountability in the Courtroom, 46 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1063, 1075 (2016). 
220. See Slagle v. Bagley, 474 F.3d 923, 925–26 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc) (discussing the political pressures that state court judges face to be “tough on 
crime”); Hon. Barbara J. Pariente & F. James Robinson, Jr., A New Era for Judicial Retention 
Elections: The Rise of and Defense Against Unfair Political Attacks, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1529 (2016) 
(discussing the political pressures state judges face). 
221. Moran, In Police We Trust, supra note 18, at 962–70. 
222. See Janet Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 
109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1149 n.81 (2005) (“Most judges were former prosecutors and retain their 
prosecutorial bias.”); Andrew Manuel Crespo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal 
Adjudication in the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1985, 1987 (2016) (noting that, since 
1975, the number of former prosecutors on the U.S. Supreme Court has more than tripled); Tracey L. 
Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with 
Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 912 (1995) (observing that some appellate judges 
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demographic that is often more disconnected than others from the realities 
of police misconduct.223 Even well-intentioned judges make decisions 
based on implicit cognitive biases in favor of the police.224 Cognitive bias 
research shows that when judges expect a police officer to be credible, 
and a defendant not, those judges are more likely to make evidentiary 
rulings that align with their expectations.225 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
The flaw identified at the beginning of this Article—an imbalance in 
access to and ability to utilize evidence that could sway the jury’s 
conclusions as to the credibility of a police officer versus a defendant, and 
thereby the jury’s verdict—is both deep-rooted and multi-faceted. For 
decades, our legal system has treated police officers as favored players, 
deferring to their judgments and reluctant to acknowledge their 
                                                     
are former prosecutors, which may influence their reluctance to hold prosecutors accountable); 
Editorial, The Homogenous Federal Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/opinion/the-homogeneous-federal-bench.html (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2018) (“[F]ederal judges continue to be drawn overwhelmingly from the ranks of 
prosecutors and corporate lawyers.”). 
223. Nikole Hannah-Jones, Khalil Gibran Muhammad, POLITICO (Apr. 2015) 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/letter-from-black-america-police-115545 
[https://perma.cc/7ES7-KTNB] (quoting Khalil Gibran Muhammad explaining that “[w]hite people, 
by and large, do not know what it is like to be occupied by a police force. They don’t understand it 
because it is not the type of policing they experience.”); Jaros, Criminal Doctrines of Faith, supra 
note 213, at 44 (commenting that “a more diverse bench might produce a more balanced view of how 
police and prosecutors actually act”); Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2008 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133, 176 (2009) (noting that most white Americans “are unlikely to be stopped 
and frisked without good reason . . . [but] [t]he same cannot be said for others, particularly minority 
citizens”); Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Gavel Gap: Who Sits in Judgment on State 
Courts?, AM. CONSTITUTIONAL SOC’Y (2016), http://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6D87-68V7] (analyzing data showing that more than half of state court judges are 
white men); Rich Morin & Renee Stepler, The Racial Confidence Gap in Police Performance, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Sep. 29, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/09/29/the-racial-confidence-
gap-in-police-performance/ [https://perma.cc/7DX8-N7FV] (noting that white people are far more 
likely to express trust in police). 
224. See Findley & Scott, supra note 82, at 292 (describing the phenomenon of “tunnel vision,” 
which leads police, prosecutors, and judges, to assume a suspect is guilty and filter all evidence and 
evidentiary decisions through that lens). 
225. Id. at 314 (“This phenomenon can be particularly significant in criminal cases, where an 
individual is being judged—by police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and jurors—and where 
the initial working hypothesis presented to each actor in the system is that the defendant is guilty 
(despite the theoretical presumption of innocence.”); id. at 308–09, 311–12, 324. 
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misconduct.226 The evidentiary doctrines that enable this imbalance have 
been in effect, though heavily criticized, for decades as well.227 
Nonetheless, these concerns are not without remedy, nor are the rules 
and doctrines that have contributed to this imbalance immutable. In 
Part III, I provide recommendations for reform in three major areas that 
have created the unfair credibility contests defendants face today: 
evidentiary doctrines, existence (or non-existence) of police records, and 
defense access to those records. I devote the most attention to the issues 
of existence of and defense access to police records, because the least has 
been written on these topics. My goal with these proposals is to create a 
playing field that is, at least in this limited area, level between the 
defendant and the government. A compelling argument could be made 
that even a level playing field is insufficient, and that it should slant in the 
defendant’s favor, because many jurors come into trials predisposed to 
believe police officers,228 distrust defendants,229 and invert the 
presumption of innocence.230 Although I am inclined to agree with this 
argument, one need not take such a strong position in order to accept the 
reforms I propose. 
A. Existence of Police Records 
A preliminary step to remedy a defendant’s inability to obtain police 
misconduct records is ensuring that the records exist. The lack of 
empirical data surrounding police conduct (and misconduct) has been 
criticized since at least the famous Wickersham Commission report of 
1931.231 Despite numerous laws in the past several decades directed at 
                                                     
226. See supra notes 17–19. 
227. See sections I.B–D. (discussing other commentators’ critiques of these doctrines). 
228. See State v. Anderson, 111 P.3d 369, 380 (Ariz. 2005) (permitting two jurors to remain on 
jury after saying they would be inclined to give greater weight to testimony of police officer); Phoebe 
Ellsworth et al., Juror Comprehension and Public Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788, 811 
(2000) (“[M]ost White Americans believe that police officers are the most trustworthy witnesses.”); 
Amy Farrell et al., Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities and Decision Making in 
Criminal Cases, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 773, 786 (2013) (observing that white jurors in particular are 
likely to side with prosecutors and police officers in criminal cases). 
229. Ellsworth et al., supra note 228, at 811 (“Most Americans—Black, White, and Hispanic—
believe that a person on trial for a crime is probably guilty.”). 
230. See Laufer, supra note 16, at 349–50, 361–62, 367–69 (citing multiple sources for the 
conclusion that jurors are predisposed to believe the defendant guilty). 
231. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF’T, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 155 (1931) (noting that “[w]e are without information that would enable us to state 
whether [an illegal police] practice, taking country as a whole, is increasing or decreasing”); Harmon, 
supra note 134, at 1121 (arguing that, in today’s society, “we still lack enough information about 
what the police do to shape their conduct effectively”). 
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improving the government’s ability to track defendants arrested, charged, 
or convicted of crimes,232 or engaged in other conduct the government 
deems suspicious,233 far fewer efforts have been directed at recording 
police misconduct.234 Funding for records collection is typically aimed at 
assisting, rather than assessing, law enforcement.235 That must change. 
I propose three remedies that each address different aspects of the 
recordkeeping crisis. First, states should, as a matter of state statute, 
require police departments to keep readily searchable records of certain 
data. This data should include, at a minimum: every instance of police use 
of force on a civilian; the number of arrests each officer makes and the 
race of the person the officer is arresting; the number of times each officer 
charges a civilian with resisting arrest, obstructing or interfering with the 
officer, assault of an officer, battery of an officer, or any other offense in 
which the officer claims to be the victim of the crime; and the number of 
times each officer has been the subject of a complaint, the basis of the 
complaint, and the results of any investigation into that complaint. 
Second, prosecutor’s offices should be required by law to maintain lists 
of every incident in which either (1) a judge finds a police officer lacking 
credibility in any case the office prosecuted or (2) the prosecutor’s review 
of the case reveals that the police officer appears to have made false 
statements, whether written or oral, and whether during in-court 
testimony, in conversations with the prosecutor’s office, or in police 
reports or communications with other police officers. Some jurisdictions 
already have a form of this list: in Washington D.C., the prosecutor’s 
office maintains a list of police officers with “credibility issues,” which 
they collect in part from information provided by the Metropolitan Police 
Department after an officer is disciplined.236 Many, jurisdictions, 
however, have no system in place to create such lists, even when they have 
access to the information.237 
                                                     
232. See supra section I.A. 
233. See supra notes 23–30, 49–50. 
234. Harmon, supra note 134, at 1135–36 (discussing the few national databases that record police 
data and the dearth of information they record, and noting that the government has no mechanism to 
catalog “the extent and kind of contact between police and victims and offenders [or] . . . the nature 
and result of disciplinary proceedings; citizen complaints; and information about police responses to 
service calls”). 
235. Id. at 1141–43 (noting that federal funding “overwhelmingly promote[s] databases for 
criminal law enforcement” rather than, for example, a national database of police officers who have 
been decertified based on misconduct). 
236. See Abel, supra note 8, at 774–75 (and footnotes therein). 
237. Id. at 775–79. 
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Lastly, I recommend requiring state or local independent agencies to 
collect and periodically audit the data I describe in my first two 
recommendations. In some jurisdictions, this could be handled by an 
existing agency such as an independent monitor, already tasked with 
reviewing complaints of civilian misconduct or providing 
recommendations to the police departments about policy reforms.238 
Many jurisdictions, however, still have no such agency, or have an 
independent review agency with so little authority that it cannot effect 
change.239 In these situations, either a new entity must be created, or the 
existing body must be given expanded power to collect and review this 
data. At a minimum, the agency should be able to review the reports and 
determine whether the police departments and prosecutor’s offices are 
actually collecting and submitting records. If, for example, one 
department reports no uses of force by its officers, then further 
investigation should be done to determine why no such records were kept. 
One reason I suggest this data be mandated by state statute, and collected 
by a state rather than local agency, is so that the data can be compared 
between jurisdictions; unless police departments use standardized 
reporting systems, it will be difficult to make any meaningful comparison 
among jurisdictions.240 
B. Defense Access to Police Records 
For purposes of this Article, my argument for reform of the police 
misconduct disclosure process—that is, allowing defense counsel access 
to police misconduct records—is limited to the context of criminal trials. 
Other scholars have, in contexts outside the criminal trial, called for 
increased transparency with respect to police practices, policies, and 
records.241 While I agree with these scholars, and have myself advocated 
for improved public accountability in the realm of police records,242 the 
need for access is at its most urgent in the context of a criminal trial, where 
the harsh consequences of a criminal conviction and subsequent loss of 
                                                     
238. For a directory of jurisdictions that already have some form of civilian oversight agency, see 
NAT’L ASS’N FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENF’T, POLICE OVERSIGHT BY JURISDICTION (USA), 
http://www.nacole.org/police_oversight_by_jurisdiction_usa. [https://perma.cc/3KPF-TXRP]. 
239. See Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, supra note 144, at 869–74, 878–82. 
240. See Harmon, supra note 134, at 1131. 
241. E.g., id. at 1130–33; Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000); 
Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
645, 678–79 (2004).  
242. See Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, supra note 144; Moran, In Police We Trust, 
supra note 18, at 993–1003. 
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liberty are at stake. Accordingly, I focus my reform recommendations 
there. 
One initial step in reforming the informational asymmetry defense 
counsel faces with respect to police officer witnesses would be to permit 
depositions of police officers in criminal cases. Most jurisdictions permit 
depositions rarely if at all in criminal cases,243 and police officers can, and 
typically do, refuse to speak with defense counsel prior to trial. In these 
scenarios, counsel may have nothing but a police report authored by the 
officer, summarizing the police officer’s investigation or role in the case, 
to prepare her cross-examination at trial. A deposition, in which counsel 
can ask the officer about his prior history, could be one step in the 
direction of remedying the informational imbalance. It is not, however, a 
sufficient step. In states where police records are generally deemed 
confidential, one can easily imagine the deposition devolving into 
constant objections by the officer’s representative, necessitating a need 
for judicial involvement into the issue of what information may be 
disclosed. Additionally, if the officer lies about his previous history, 
defense counsel may be none the wiser. 
My primary contribution for the reform of defense access to police 
records comes in the form of a model statute dictating how criminal courts 
should handle defendants’ requests for police personnel records. There is, 
as Jonathan Abel points out, “no nationwide consensus” on the issue of 
whether, when, and how to disclose police personnel records in criminal 
cases.244 This model statute offers a possible solution that virtually any 
jurisdiction, even those favoring strict confidentiality provisions for 
police records, could adopt. I first provide the model statute below, and 
then explain the import of each of its component parts. 
The proposed statute reads as follows: 
 
Defendant’s Right to Law Enforcement Personnel Records in 
Criminal Cases. 
 
This statute applies to all criminal prosecutions in which a current 
or former law enforcement officer is involved in the case as a 
complainant, alleged victim, or witness for the prosecution, 
provided the officer’s involvement arose from an incident that 
occurred while the officer was acting in an official capacity as an 
officer. 
                                                     
243. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 191, at 1235 (noting that only ten states permit depositions in 
criminal cases); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a). 
244. Abel, supra note 8, at 747. 
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(1) Information known to prosecution. In all cases in which the 
prosecution has actual or constructive knowledge that the 
personnel records of a law enforcement officer involved in 
the case contain potentially exculpatory information, the 
prosecution shall provide reasonable notice to the defendant 
in advance of trial that this information exists. Constructive 
knowledge is defined as actual knowledge by an agent of the 
prosecution, including law enforcement officers within the 
jurisdiction in which the prosecution operates, provided that 
the prosecution is legally authorized to access this 
information. 
 
(a) If otherwise permitted by law, the prosecution shall 
provide to the defendant in advance of trial all potentially 
exculpatory information in the personnel records of the 
officer. 
 
(b) If the prosecution is not otherwise permitted by law to 
provide this information to the defendant, then the 
prosecution may satisfy its burden of disclosure by 
notifying the defendant that the information exists. 
 
(2) Information requested by defendant. Regardless of whether 
the prosecution discloses information to the defendant 
pursuant to section (1) of this statute, a defendant in any 
criminal case in which a law enforcement officer is a witness 
for the prosecution may move for a subpoena duces tecum of 
the personnel records of that officer. The defendant shall 
serve this motion on the court, the prosecution, the law 
enforcement agency in possession of the records, and the 
individual law enforcement officer whose records the 
defendant is seeking. 
 
(a) Upon filing of the motion for subpoena duces tecum, all 
parties on whom the motion was served shall have seven 
days to respond. If no objection is filed within seven days, 
the court shall grant the motion and order the agency in 
possession of such records to disclose the records to the 
defendant without redaction. 
 
(b) If any party on whom the motion for subpoena duces 
tecum was served objects to the defendant’s motion, the 
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trial court shall hold a pretrial hearing to determine 
whether the records should be released. Prior to the 
hearing, the party objecting to the subpoena duces tecum 
shall make the records available for inspection, under 
seal, to both the court and defense counsel. At the 
hearing, the court shall determine whether the records 
will be released to defense counsel. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law addressing the confidentiality of 
the records, the court shall order the records to be released 
to defense counsel unless the party objecting to release of 
the records can show that the records (i) contain no 
exculpatory information, or (ii) are not arguably material 
to the case. In determining whether the records shall be 
released, the court shall consider: the content of the 
records; the significance of the officer’s testimony to the 
government’s case; and the significance of the records to 
the defendant’s articulated theory of defense. 
 
(3) Admissibility of records. If the court determines that the 
records shall be released, their admissibility and use at trial 
shall be governed by the Rules of Evidence. 
 
(4) Confidentiality of records. At all times throughout the 
criminal case, the personnel records at issue shall be released 
only under a protective order, which governs both the 
prosecution and the defendant. The terms of the protective 
order include: 
 
(a) Access to the personnel records shall be limited to the 
attorneys and the defendant. 
 
(b) Release of any information contained in the subpoenaed 
files shall be used solely for the defense or prosecution of 
the instant case. 
 
(c) Copies of the personnel records shall be made only for 
purposes of prosecuting or defending the case, and shall 
be returned to the court at the conclusion of the case, to 
be retained in a sealed portion of the court file. 
 
(d) The court retains continuing jurisdiction for purposes of 
enforcing compliance with the protective order. Any 
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violation of the order may subject the offending party to 
contempt or other sanctions. 
 
Title and opening clause: This section is intended to make clear that 
the statute applies to all criminal prosecutions in which a law enforcement 
officer may testify on behalf of the government. The broad language of 
the statute removes any obligation for the prosecution to determine 
whether the officer is a critical witness in the case, and thus whether, in 
the prosecutor’s opinion, the information actually need be disclosed. 
Although that consideration may be pertinent to the ultimate issue of 
whether the personnel records or information contained therein can be 
used at trial, it should have no bearing on the preliminary determination 
of whether the defendant needs to be notified about information regarding 
this officer. Additionally, the statute is narrowly applicable only to 
criminal cases because defendants have the most to lose in criminal 
prosecutions, and therefore the greatest interest in this kind of 
information. Although a similar statute may well be appropriate for civil 
cases, that is not the topic of this Article. 
Section (1): This section mandates that, when a prosecutor’s office or 
agent of the prosecution has knowledge that personnel records pertaining 
to a law enforcement witness contain potentially exculpatory evidence, it 
notifies the defendant about that information. This provision is important 
because, as Jonathan Abel points out, many jurisdictions treat police 
personnel records as exempt from Brady, and do not require prosecutors 
to notify defense counsel even if the records contain exculpatory 
information.245 Other prosecutor’s offices, apparently believing that they 
can sidestep Brady by simply not learning about the records, actively 
attempt to avoid learning about exculpatory information within the 
records.246 My model statute addresses this problem by specifying that 
prosecutors must disclose this information if they know or have 
constructive knowledge of the records, and makes clear that constructive 
knowledge, consistent with Kyles v. Whitley,247 includes information in 
the possession of the police department as long as the prosecution may 
legally access this information.248 
Pursuant to subsection (1)(a), if the prosecution is permitted by law to 
provide the records to defense counsel, it must do so. This provision 
circumvents the need for lengthy pretrial hearings in which the defendant 
                                                     
245. Id. at 745, 773–78 (and citations therein). 
246. Id. 
247. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
248. Id. at 437. 
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must request the records and the court must determine whether they 
should be released; in jurisdictions where the prosecution has access to 
the records and they are not otherwise confidential, the statute requires the 
prosecution to release the records. However, because police personnel 
records are confidential in many jurisdictions, and not within the ability 
of the prosecution to disclose,249 subsection (1)(b) acknowledges that, in 
these jurisdictions, the prosecution can comply with Brady by providing 
notice to the defendant of the existence of the records. 
Section (2): Section (2) dictates the procedure for defense counsel to 
obtain law enforcement personnel records that either are not known to or 
cannot be disclosed by the prosecution. In these cases, section (2) makes 
clear that the defendant still has a right to request such records. Unlike 
section (1)(a), which applies to records that are not confidential, section 
(2) permits the prosecution, law enforcement agency, or individual officer 
to object to disclosure of the records. If no one objects, subsection (2)(a) 
mandates that the court grant the defendant’s motion and order that the 
records be disclosed defense counsel. This provision is important because 
many jurisdictions either do not require courts to disclose law 
enforcement records under any circumstance, or provide that the records 
need only be disclosed in a subset of specified cases, such as those 
involving claims of assault or battery on an officer.250 Such laws 
underestimate the scenarios in which an officer’s credibility will play an 
important role in the trial, and give inadequate weight to a defendant’s 
constitutional right to exculpatory evidence in the government’s 
possession.251 Subsection (2)(a) addresses this concern by explicitly 
providing that the court must disclose the records absent objection from 
an interested party. 
Subsection (2)(b) addresses the scenario in which either the 
prosecution, law enforcement agency, or officer objects to disclosure of 
the records. In this case, the court is directed to decide the issue of whether 
the records should be disclosed prior to trial, in a hearing at which all 
interested parties may present arguments about why the records should or 
should not be disclosed. My proposed statute represents a significant 
departure from many jurisdictions in three ways. 
First, subsection (2)(b) allows defense counsel to inspect (though not 
take possession of) the records prior to the hearing in which the court 
determines whether they should be released. I acknowledge this is a 
                                                     
249. See supra section II.B. 
250. See supra sections II.B–C. 
251. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
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potentially controversial point, and that many jurisdictions prefer in 
camera inspection of personnel records by the court alone, after which the 
court may in its discretion determine whether the records should be 
disclosed.252 Although the practice of in camera review is intended to 
protect an officer’s right to the privacy of the officer’s personnel records, 
my objection is that trial judges are ill-equipped to determine, prior to 
trial, whether the records are relevant to the defendant’s theory of defense. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has for this reason criticized the “practice of 
producing government documents to the trial judge for his determination 
of relevancy,” because the court, without input from the defense, cannot 
properly determine the relevance of the records.253 And the defendant, 
without access to the records, cannot adequately weigh in on how the 
unknown records might affect the theory of the defense. At least one state 
supreme court has also rejected the practice of in camera review of 
potentially-confidential records, concluding that trial judges cannot 
properly make determinations about relevance without knowing “what is 
or is not inconsistent or immaterial to the defendant’s case.”254 
Second, section (2)(b) presumes that the personnel records should be 
released and allows the party objecting to release to overcome this 
presumption only by showing that the records are either not exculpatory, 
or not arguably material to the defendant’s case. The presumption of 
release is intended primarily to address what I describe in sections II.B 
and II.C as problems associated with political willpower and judicial 
deference. For many judges it is all too easy to simply decline to release 
law enforcement records, because opposing law enforcement is not 
politically popular, they do not want to afford time in their busy dockets 
to litigate hotly-contested issues pertaining to disclosure of these records, 
or they have trouble envisioning how an officer’s prior history could be 
relevant to the defense.255 Making the records presumptively releasable 
addresses this problem by requiring judges to state a specific, legitimate 
basis for denying release of the records, and provides an opportunity for 
closer scrutiny on appeal of judge’s decisions to deny release of the 
records. 
                                                     
252. E.g., AURORA, COLO. MUNI. CODE. § 50-41(b)–(c) (2017) (requiring in camera review of 
personnel records to determine whether and which information shall be admissible); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW § 50-a(3) (2017) (requiring police personnel records to be sealed and sent to judge for 
review to determine admissibility after such a request has been made). 
253. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957). 
254. Jones v. State, 464 A.2d 977, 982 (1983). 
255. See supra section II.C. 
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Third, the model statute I propose does not allow the court to refuse to 
disclose the records based solely on the likelihood of harm to the privacy 
interests of the police officer. Nor does it direct the court to consider an 
officer’s privacy interests when determining whether to release the 
records. The statute does appropriately take into account the officer’s 
privacy interests in section (4), which limits each party’s use of the records 
to the specific context of the criminal case. Although the notion that police 
officers have a privacy interest in their personnel records is often used as 
basis for refusal to disclose the records,256 in the context of a criminal case, 
such interests cannot properly take precedence over a defendant’s 
constitutional right to disclosure of exculpatory evidence.257 Instead, the 
factors I direct the court to consider—the content of the records, 
importance of the officer’s testimony to the government’s case, and 
importance of the records to the defendant’s theory of defense—are all 
aimed at determining whether the evidence is exculpatory and material 
under Brady and its progeny.258 Should the records meet this test, then 
they must be disclosed to the defendant. 
For the same reason—that defendants’ constitutional right to 
exculpatory evidence in criminal cases trumps officers’ privacy interest in 
their personnel records—the statute provides that the records shall be 
released “[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law addressing the 
confidentiality of the records.” The model statute is intended to preempt 
any other statutes or rules of law addressing the confidentiality of police 
personnel records. 
Section (3): Section (3) is designed to make clear that, when records 
are released to defense counsel, their admissibility should be evaluated 
like any other evidence. I include this provision because, as discussed in 
Part II.C, when courts interpose the admissibility determination with the 
decision whether to release the records, they tend to err on the side of 
refusing release. This section makes clear that the issues of access to and 
use of the records are not interchangeable, and thus encourages courts to 
release the records. 
Section (4): Section (4) protects officers’ privacy interest in not having 
their personnel records disclosed to the public, and balances, to the extent 
constitutionally permissible, that interest against the defendants’ 
constitutional right to exculpatory evidence. This section makes clear that 
the records are disclosed only for purposes of the criminal case, and may 
                                                     
256. See Martinelli v. Dist. Court, 612 P.2d 1083, 1091–92 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); City of Hemet 
v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1411, 1429 (Cal Ct. App. 1995). 
257. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
258. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434–37 (1995); United States 
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
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not be used for any other purpose. Once the criminal case is over, all 
records are to be returned to the court, under seal, and not used or 
distributed for any other purpose. 
The model statute can, of course, be adapted to the vagaries of each 
particular jurisdiction—in systems where police records are a matter of 
public record, the statute may be condensed to remove any concessions to 
confidentiality. But in the majority of jurisdictions, where confidentiality 
is a common basis for objections to disclosure of the records and litigation 
is generally decided in favor of the officer, this statute could serve the 
important purposes of actualizing a defendant’s constitutional right to 
exculpatory evidence and thereby righting the scales that currently tip 
heavily against a defendant’s ability to contest the credibility of police 
officer witnesses. 
C. Evidentiary Reforms 
As discussed in Part I, three primary evidentiary rules and doctrines—
Rule 609, Rule 404(b), and the res gestae or inextricably intertwined 
doctrines—are responsible for creating most of the government’s 
opportunities to introduce evidence of a defendant’s other acts or 
character that are not integral to the charged crime.259 Scholars and 
defense practitioners have criticized these rules for years, pointing out that 
once a jury hears of a defendant’s prior convictions or past bad acts, that 
information tends to dominate the trial and dissuade the jury from 
focusing on the government’s proof with respect to the charged crime.260 
These critiques are all the more important in today’s climate, where the 
government has near-instant access to a tremendous amount of 
information about the defendant that, before recent advances in 
technology, it did not have.261 Whereas in the past a defendant’s prior 
history may have played a role in only a small percentage of cases, in 
recent years it has taken on an increasingly central role in criminal trials, 
such that introduction of prior convictions and other acts evidence is no 
longer rare at all.262 Even if these rules made sense at one time (a theory 
open to much dispute), they no longer do. 
                                                     
259. See supra sections I.B–D. 
260. Id.  
261. See supra section I.A. 
262. United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2012); Blinka, supra note 92, at 110–12; 
Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of Res Gestae, supra note 13, at 726; Sonenshein, supra note 92, 
at 219. 
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1. Narrow the Scope of Rule 609 with Respect to Criminal 
Defendants 
The applicability of Rule 609(a), permitting impeachment with prior 
felony convictions, to criminal defendants is perhaps the most heavily-
criticized of all the evidentiary rules. Scholars have faulted it for relying 
on false assumptions about the credibility of people with prior 
convictions263 as well as the reliability of those convictions,264 
disincentivizing defendants from testifying,265 contributing to racial 
biases and hyper-involvement of black defendants in the justice system,266 
providing no meaningful guidelines for judges speculating about the 
probative value of such convictions,267 and giving prosecutors a too-
powerful tool for winning otherwise weak cases.268 
I agree with many of these critiques, and I join the growing chorus of 
scholars advocating for complete or near-abolition of Rule 609(a) as 
applied to criminal defendants.269 A few states—Hawaii, Kansas, and 
Montana—have already done so.270 Montana’s rule goes the furthest, and 
completely bans evidence of prior convictions for use in impeaching 
defendants or any witnesses.271 In Kansas and Hawaii, evidence of a 
defendant’s prior conviction can be introduced only if the conviction 
involved dishonesty, and only if the defendant first introduced evidence 
suggesting good moral character.272 
The primary criticism from those who believe abolition is too drastic a 
remedy is that it will be unfair for the government if defendants can testify 
and portray themselves as law-abiding citizens, when the government 
                                                     
263. Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, supra note 16, at 1978; Roger C. Park & Michael 
J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 
949, 964 (2006). 
264. Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 565 (2014). 
265. Friedman, supra note 66, at 639; Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s 
Testimony, supra note 64, at 836. 
266. See, e.g., Carodine, supra note 16, at 521; Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 
supra note 263, at 576–78; Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony, supra 
note 64, at 838–39, 864–67. 
267. Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony, supra note 64, at 842. 
268. See id. at 858–59; Carodine, supra note 16, at 524; Ladd, supra note 66, at 186. 
269. See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to 
Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 318–19 (2008); 
Blume, supra note 63; Carodine, supra note 16, at 524; Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 
supra note 16. 
270. See KAN. STAT. § 60-421 (2011); HRS § 626-1, Rule 609(a); MONT. R. EVID. 609. 
271. MONT. R. EVID. 609. 
272. KAN. STAT. § 60-421 (2011); HRS § 626-1, Rule 609(a). 
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knows that to be false but cannot do anything about it.273 But that extreme 
situation need not be the rule. One remedy, which few commentators 
identify, is that in such a situation the government could utilize Rule of 
Evidence 404(a)(2)(A), which states that, if a defendant introduces 
evidence of the defendant’s own pertinent character trait, the government 
may introduce evidence to rebut that trait.274 Under that Rule it would 
appear that, if the defendant explicitly testified to beings a law-abiding 
citizen with no prior convictions, the government could rebut that 
testimony with evidence of the prior conviction, irrespective of Rule 609. 
Setting Rule 404(a)(2)(A) aside, another possible and easily-
implemented solution to the problem of unrebutted false testimony from 
a defendant is to permit use of the prior conviction for impeachment 
purposes in just one instance: when the defendant falsely testifies that the 
defendant has no such prior convictions.275 As long as the defendant does 
not open the door to this information by demonstrably untrue claims 
regarding a lack of prior convictions, the government may also not inquire 
into the prior conviction.276 Such a rule assuages the concerns of 
prosecutors who believe their hands will be tied by an absolute ban on 
prior conviction evidence, but takes significant steps toward righting the 
imbalances in the evidence the government can use to attack defendant 
credibility. 
Rule 609(a)(2), in contrast to (a)(1), permits impeachment by 
convictions that involve a “dishonest act or false statement,” and requires 
courts to admit such convictions without any analysis of their probative 
value or prejudicial effect.277 Although convictions for dishonesty or 
falsehoods have at least superficially more relationship to general 
credibility, a compelling case can be made for abolition of this rule as 
well, save for the case where the defendant falsely volunteers that the 
defendant has no such convictions. Many offenses that fall within the 
                                                     
273. See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983); State v. Brunson, 625 
A.2d 1085, 1092 (N.J. 1993) (allowing impeachment by prior conviction to “insure that a prior 
offender does not appear to the jury as a citizen of unassailable veracity”). 
274. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A).  
275. See State v. Burnett, 558 P.2d 1087, 1090–91 (Kan. 1976) (permitting impeachment of a 
defendant with prior conviction if the defendant explicitly denies having such a conviction); Roberts, 
Conviction by Prior Impeachment, supra note 16, at 2036 (proposing a rule of evidence that reads, 
“In a criminal case where the defendant takes the stand, the prosecution shall not ask the defendant 
or introduce evidence as to whether the defendant has been convicted of a crime for the purpose of 
attacking the defendant’s credibility. If the defendant denies the existence of a conviction, that denial 
may be contradicted by evidence that the conviction exists.”). 
276. See Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, supra note 16, at 2036. 
277. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
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category of “dishonesty,” particularly theft and shoplifting, are often more 
probative of poverty and desperation than they are inclination to lie while 
testifying. 
Even if a jurisdiction is not willing to abandon impeachment by prior 
convictions involving dishonesty, at a minimum it should narrow the 
triggering convictions to include only those for false statements made 
under oath in court, rather than “dishonest acts.” West Virginia has 
already done this, adopting a rule that, for purposes of attacking the 
credibility of a defendant in a criminal case, “evidence that the accused 
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime 
involved perjury or false swearing.”278 Such a rule would inform the fact-
finder when the defendant has previously been convicted for testifying 
falsely in court, but would weed out actions such as burglary, theft, sale 
of narcotics, and other offenses courts include in the category of dishonest 
acts, that have little or no proven connection to a defendant’s likelihood 
of lying in court.279 
2. Add an Evidentiary Burden to Rule 404(b) 
Rule 404(b), as discussed in section I.C, allows the prosecution to 
introduce other acts by the defendant under the guise of proving motive, 
intent, knowledge, or a wide variety of other issues.280 Although Rule 
404(b) is preferable to the res gestae doctrine in that it requires the 
evidence to be admitted for a specific, identified purpose, it still provides 
insufficient guidelines for courts to determine whether the evidence 
should be admitted. It contains no standards for assessing whether the 
evidence is relevant, or for determining whether the other acts actually 
occurred. Instead, Rule 404(b)(2) simply says that other acts evidence 
“may be admissible” for a purpose other than to prove bad character and 
dictates only that the prosecution must provide reasonable notice in 
advance of trial, or during trial if it can show good cause for the delay.281 
I propose a two-part amendment to the existing rule, designed both to 
provide guidance for courts to determine whether other acts should be 
admitted, and tamp down on the tendency of prosecutors and courts to 
allow other acts evidence to dominate criminal trials.282 The amendment, 
                                                     
278. W. VA. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
279. See United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Ortiz, 553 
F.2d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1977); State v. Ray, 116 Wash. 2d 531, 544–45, 806 P.2d 1220, 1228 (1991).  
280. See supra section I.C. 
281. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
282. See supra Part I. 
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which would be styled Rule 404(b)(3) under the numbering scheme of the 
federal rules, reads: 
 
(3) The party seeking to introduce evidence of a crime, wrong, or 
act other than the charged offense has the burden of proving 
in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, that: 
 
(A) By a preponderance of the evidence, the other act was 
committed by the defendant; and 
 
(B) The probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs 
the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. 
 
The proposed amendment would increase the reliability of other acts 
evidence, by requiring a hearing (in most cases, pretrial) to determine 
whether the other act was in fact committed by the defendant. This is 
important because, as discussed in section I.C, many courts allow the 
government to admit other acts evidence based on charges that were 
dismissed or acts that were never charged at all, which presents both a 
question of reliability and a grave risk of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant.283 Currently, Rule 404(b) contains no language addressing the 
standard for determining whether other acts evidence is sufficiently 
reliable to use at trial,284 and courts have no uniform standard for 
determining reliability.285 The U.S. Supreme Court has set the bar 
extremely low, dismissing even the preponderance standard and holding 
that judges may admit other acts evidence as long as there is “sufficient” 
evidence for a jury to find that the other act occurred.286 Other 
jurisdictions apply a preponderance standard, but reject the requirement 
of a pretrial hearing and instead find the evidence sufficiently reliable as 
long as a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance during trial that 
the other act occurred.287 My proposed amendment would add needed 
clarity to the reliability determination, and give pause to courts otherwise 
prone to cede their gatekeeping function to the jury. 
The proposed amendment would also deter courts quick to admit this 
evidence, by placing the burden on the government to prove, and courts 
                                                     
283. See supra section I.C. 
284. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
285. See supra notes 90–93. 
286. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688–89 (1988). 
287. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 845 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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to find, that the evidence is substantially more probative than 
prejudicial—the opposite of the standard for admissibility under 
Rule 403.288 This heightened burden could slow down the tidal wave of 
other acts evidence admitted at trial, and provide greater opportunities for 
appellate courts to scrutinize trial courts’ application of Rule 404(b). 
3. Abolish the Res Gestae or Inextricably-Intertwined Doctrine 
Although the res gestae or inextricably-intertwined doctrine is codified 
in only a few states,289 it is accepted by case law in every federal 
jurisdiction and many states.290 As discussed in section I.D, this doctrine 
serves primarily as an end-run around Rule 404(b), by permitting 
evidence of acts that are not the basis of the charged crime, as long as 
these acts are deemed helpful to the jury’s understanding of the charged 
crime. 
The doctrine causes significantly more harm than good, and I 
recommend abandoning it completely. Its purported purpose is to allow 
the jury context for understanding the charged offense.291 Rule 404(b), 
however, already provides that opportunity. If the evidence can be used 
for a specific purpose, such as showing motive to commit the charged 
crime (or any of the other many reasons 404(b) evidence is introduced), 
then the government can provide notice to the defendant of its intent to 
use this evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), and attempt to elicit the 
evidence that way.292 If the evidence does not fall within any of the 
existing exceptions, this may be a signal that the government wants to use 
the evidence simply to make the defendant looks worse in the eyes of the 
jury.293 Since this doctrine has no standard by which the judge should 
measure admissibility, courts nearly always default to allowing the 
                                                     
288. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting courts to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by a danger of,” inter alia, unfair prejudice). 
289. See, e.g., KY. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404(B) (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 48.035(3) (2007). 
290. See Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of Res Gestae, supra note 13; supra note 117 (listing 
cases). 
291. People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Colo. 1994); Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of 
Res Gestae, supra note 13, at 726. 
292. Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of Res Gestae, supra note 13, at 726 (explaining that, in 
many inextricably-intertwined cases, prosecutors could have “just as easily” relied on Rule 404(b) to 
admit the evidence). 
293. Id. at 723, 728–30; see also United States v. Edwards, 581 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927–29 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (describing the inextricably-
intertwined doctrine as a “convenient vehicle” for prosecutors to circumvent the evidentiary rules); 
United States v. Ameri, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1169, 1172 (E.D. Ark. 2004). 
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evidence.294 In the majority of states, the doctrine does not require 
advance notice to the defendant—in contrast to Rule 404(b), which 
requires prosecutors to notify defendants prior to trial of their intent to use 
other acts evidence295—and can therefore be used as a means of ambush 
at trial. Abandoning this doctrine would require the prosecution to notify 
the defendant prior to trial—an important protection of the defendant’s 
right to meaningfully confront opposing witnesses296—and give the court 
at least some standard for measuring the admissibility of the evidence, i.e., 
whether the government can articulate a specific purpose for the evidence 
other than to show that the defendant is a bad person. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants should not be condemned to lose at trial simply because the 
key witness against them is a police officer. Much needs to be done, on a 
variety of fronts, to remedy the existing disparity in the information the 
government can access and use against defendants in criminal trials, 
versus the information defendants can obtain or use regarding police 
officer witnesses. Although these inequities will take significant thought 
and political will to address, the reforms I propose represent concrete steps 
toward righting a longstanding imbalance prejudicing defendants in their 
attempts to contest the credibility of police officer witnesses. 
 
                                                     
294. E.g., United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 763–65 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Ripinsky, 109 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1997). 
295. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
296. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); State v. Graham, 314 S.C. 
383, 385 (1994).  
